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EFFICIENCY: AN EVALUATIVE TOOL FOR MANAGERS? 
by Car-1 R. Jones, Associate Professor 
Dept. of Operations Research and 
Administrative Sciences 
As this is the section of the Management Quarterly devoted to faculty 
opinion, I have chosen to discuss a conjecture I have been considering 
of late. The conjecture in its strongest and possibly most striking 
form is: 
The concept of efficiency is not applicable to governmental 
activities. 
A corollary of this is: 
The concept of efficiency is not applicable in evaluating 
the managerial performance of governmental administrators. 
Of course, a conjecture stated this sharply and generally will, in all 
likelihood, be modified by further analysis and testing . However, 
its present form is useful in illuminating the nature and characteristics 
of what has been a rather shocking thought -- at least to one brought up 
on the importance and value of efficiency. 
Let us proceed by first recalling theessence of the idea of 
efficiency. Simply stated, it is that an activity is efficient if the 
maximum quantity of output is obtained from a fixed level of input using 
the available technology. Sophistication is introduced when multiple 
outputs and inputs are introduced. An activity is considered inefficient 
if it is not efficient. Note the fundamental ingredients in the concept 
of efficiency. First, there is a measure for each and eveyy output. 
Second, there is a measure for each and every input. And finally, 
there is at least one way of relating inputs to outputs: that is an 
employable technology including organizational and physical knowledge. 
Let us quickly dispose of the latter two fundamentals since my 
current thinking is that the difficulty lies with the first funda-
mental. In thinking about governmental activities, I have had no 
great difficulty in measuring the variety of inputs. These can be 
in man years, machine hours, and acres of land for instance. Thus, 
while in a given circumstance some thought and study are necessary to 
clarify the measures of inputs, I currently envisage no great con-
ceptual difficulty in developing a relationship between inputs and 
1 
outputs, provided both are in fact measurable. Which leads to what I 
currently consider the stumbling block -- the measurement of output. 
In considering output, we must be careful to distinguish between 
measuring the quantity of the output and the valuing of that output . 
For example, a given governmental activity may produce say 100 units 
of an output called widgets. This would be measurinq the output. To 
then proceed to attach, say, prices in dollars to widgets is to value 
them. Of course, this is just a simple lesson from economics which 
will be well known to the readers of the Quarterly . As the re~ders 
are also aware, values need not be in dollars which have resulted from 
economic bargaining , but may be set by such activities as political 
bargaining. 
What might not be so well known to the readers is the economists' 
distinction between pure collective goods and pure private goods. 
Basically, a pure collective good is one where all the users of the 
output consume the same physical quantity. Commonly used examples 
include natural defense, the protectio n in an urban area, the current 
nasty called air pollution, and police protection . Please note that 
private firms can produce collective goods, for example air pollution. 
The pure private goods are those outputs where each user can on his 
own volition choose the quantity he desires to consume. Common 
examples are bread, automobiles and houses. Please note here that 
governmental activities can produce private goods, for example ships. 
Notice that at least one important facet of the distinction is whether 
after an output is produced a given user can physically exclude others 
from its use . In pure collective goods no exclusion is possible while 
in pure private goods complete exclusion is possible. As is usual, the 
11real world" exhi6its intermediary cases, but it would lead us astray 
to consider them. 
In my opinion, it is the area of collective goods as outputs that 
poses the conceptual as well as practical problems. Let us first consider 
the conceptual difficulties. Here the importance of calling this a 
conjecture is highlighted. I can offer no proof that collective goods are 
conceptually difficult to measure and in some cases may be impossible. 
However, maybe I can indicate to you what is intuitive at this time to me. 
Let us consider some examples. First the notion of nuclear deterence. 
Many man hours of thought have been devoted to deterence, yet when one 
reads the literature, one finds little if any agreement on the unit of 
measurement of deterence. Does this mean that such a measure can never 
be found. Of course, that is not true. But it at least indicat~s the 
practical difficulty in one case, and with a dash of intuition maybe i t 
indicates something about its impossibility. · 
As a second example, let us consider manpower programs. Here there 
is some, if not a lot, of agreement on the defining of a set of skills 
embodied in a worker. However, as the readers of this Quarterly are 
particularly aware, the measurement of all the aspects of a manage~s 
tasks and his associated skills has proven most difficult . Some have 
even argued it is impossible. Also with manpower programs we introduce 
the idea of individual satisfaction. This is a well known area of con-







another example of output measurement difficulty. Note that it is 
the commonly shared aspects of managerial skills and individual 
satisfaction that are some of the most difficult problems. I am sure 
that the readers• own experience can fill in many more examples. Thus, 
what we have considered, builds an intuitive picture of output meas-
urement difficulty in the practical domain, if not the conceptual. 
Let us now use the intuitive idea of output measurement difficulty 
to see what it might mean for the manager if after further analysis 
and testing it should be verified. Given the meaning of efficiency, 
it is clear that it can not be applied to operations where output 
is not measured. Thus, a manager of an activity which, there is some 
reason to believe, has nonmeasured outputs, could say, 11That idea of 
efficiency is fine, but it is not applicable to me11 • We can all fore-
cast what would happen to a manager that talked in this way. But, 
if he says yea or nay to efficiency, then he is also in some difficulty, 
as then he must be able to specify his outputs. It seems to me that one 
workable strategy for a manager who is being evaluated on an efficiency 
of operations is as follows: First, he should discuss the evaluator 1 s 
idea of efficiency and what are the measures of inputs and outputs to be 
employed. Then, if he feels there are other outputs being produced --
some of which are collective goods, for example -- a dialogue to amend 
the list could be initiated with the evaluator. ·Possibly if some of the 
outputs are nonmeasurable, at least for the feasible future, they could 
still at least be discussed in the report on the efficiency of operations. 
As a final tactic, the manager could furnish a well-argued reclama to 
the report. 
More generally, what should those of us interested in improving the 
managerial process be doing? In my opinion, we should be devoting some 
of our resources to attempting to measure output. Remember that many 
of the difficulties are practical and are amenable to solutions with the 
proper application of resources. Second, I believe we should be devoting 
research effort to the conceptual difficulties. And thirdly, we should 
be educating managers and evaluators that mechanistic application of 
efficiency norms can lead to the reduction in some outputs which are 
indeed of value to society. 
Ih su111T1ary, let me conclude by saying that efficiency is a well 
known·concept, but its application is not well known and may indeed 
be difficult. If any of the readers of the Quarterly wish to contact 
me about this opinion on efficiency, please do. It is through such 
interaction that we all learn on a small step at a time basis. 
3 
THE COMPUTER: A PUBLIC UTILITY 
by W. P. Bu.c.k 
An a.ll.t.lc.le. wluc.h a.ddlt<Ui.6€.6 .the c.oml.ng a.ge. 06 c.ompu.te.Jt 
u.:U.U.;ti_e.6. The. au.tho1t. beLi.e.ve.6 .tha.t :the1te. .l6 a. ne.e.d 601t 
.6eM.OU6 c.on.6idetut.tlon 06 whe..the.11. .thue. new u.tllltl<Ui .ohoul.d 
be added :t.o .the 11.e.gul.a.to1ty .6phe.Jte. :to deal. wLth .the .f.ega.l, 
.ooc..i.ai., and ec.onomi.c. pJz.ob.f.em.6 they po!>e.. · 
W. P. BUCK, CDR, USN, B.S., 1957, U. S. Naval Academy; 
M.S. (Management), 1971, Naval Postgraduate School. 
Thui pa.pelt Wal> .6u.bml.tted :to LTCOL Smlth 0011. BM-i.nM.6 
Va.ta. P11.oc.e.l>.6-i.ng, MN 4183. 
I. WHAT IS A PUBLIC UTILITY? 
The Encyclopaedia Britannica descri bes a public utility as : 
A special grouping of industries legally affected with a 
public interest and conducted under government regul ation. 
They occupy an intennediate position between state ser-
vices or public works, which are administered as public 
functions and hence supported by taxation, and the variety 
of business undertaking usually included under the heading 
of competitive private enterprise. They may be either 
privately or government owned--but--both publicly and pri-
vately owned utilities sell their services at prices which 
are not fixed in the open market but are governmentally 
fixed./l 
11Utility" in the term 0 computer utility " has the same connotation as it 
does in the other more familiar fields such as electrical power utilities or 
telephone utilities and merely means a service that is shared among many users, 
with each user bearing only a small fraction of the total cost of providing 








that service. However, in the case of the computer utility, the services ren-
dered are much more numerous and more complex than those of older utilities. 
In addition to making raw computer power available in a convenient and economi-
cal form, a computer utility would be concerned with almost any service or 
function which could in some way be related to the processing, storage, collec-
tion, and distribution of information./I 
COMPUTER UTILITY VS. COMPUTER SERVICE 
Like\'1ise, a computer utility differs fundamentally from the normal computer 
service bureau in that the services are supplied directly to the user in his 
home, factory, or office. Furthermore, since the user pays only for the service 
that he actually uses, a man machine interactive operating mode becomes economi-
cally feasible. 
Airline reservations, air defense, mail order tallying, inventory control 
and department store point of sale recording are specialized areas in which 
telephone data processing systems are used. These systems in which many remote-
ly located users are connected via coT11T1unication links to a central computing 
facility were the beginnings of a 11computer public utility 11 concept. 
COMPUTER PUBLIC UTILITY 
The computer public utility, then, would be a general purpose public system, 
simultaneously making available to a multitude of diverse geographically distri-
buted users a wide range of di'fferent information processing services and capa-
bilities on an on-line basis. As in any utility, the overhead would be shared 
among all users with each user's charges varying with the actual time and faci-
lities used in the solution of his problem. Ideally, such a utility would pro-
vide each user with a computer capaoility as powerful as the current technology 
pennitted whenever he needed it. The cost would be but a small fraction of an 
individually owned system. The more general term 11information util ity 11 suggested 
by Martin Greenberger is probaoly more descriptive of the kind of system with 
which this paper is concerned./1 
I I. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this paper then is to: 
1. Discuss the feasibility of such a system as a computer public utility. 
2. Explore the potential to our society of such a system. 
3. Discuss some of the problems which might be encountered. 
4. Draw some conclusions on what such a system might mean for our society. 
III. TWO PERATIONAL COMPUTER UTILITIES 
Data Resources Incorporated (DRI) is an example of small scale operations 
in which the 11computer public utility" is a reality. DRI has achieved rapid growth 
by contributing to the solution of a basic business problem--economic analysis--
as it applies to the single finn. 
/2 D. F. Parkhill, The Challenge of the Computer Utility, Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, Reading, Massachusetts, 1966, p. 3. 
/ 3 M. Greenberger, 11Banki ng and the Information Utility, 11 Computers and 
Automation, {April, 1965). 
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A little over a year ago, a group of economists and computer experts headed 
by Harvard1 s Professor Otto Eckstein formed ORI to market a new type of economic 
information service. This service provides a total forecasting environment for 
either the university economist or manager of an enterprise. Specifically ORI 
is offering: 
1. Three models of the United States economy--the DRI, Wharton, and 
Current Quarter models. 
2. A data library with an unprecedented amount of timely economic 
information. 
3. A software system to enable subscribers to make the most effec-
tive use of the model and the data base. 
4. An education and consulting service based upon the expertise of 
both its professional staff and academic consultants. 
5. The physical means to conveniently handle all the data gathered 
and processed and render expert opinion on the end product. 
At present, the system is nationally time-shared among a list of more than 
fifty clients, including Sears, Roebuck and Company, Morgan Guaranty Trust Com-
pany, and a number of Federal agencies. The system operates on Burroughs 5500 
equipment at corporate headquarters in Lexington, Massachusetts./4. 
l~EYDATA is another small j'computer utility" that is rapidly expanding oper-
ations. KEYDATA is a business ttcomputer utility" company which provides subscri-
bers with data processing services for invoicing, inventory control, accounts 
receivable, sales analysis, accounts payable, and general ledger accounting. The 
heart of the KEYDATA system is a bank of remote terminals which are located in 
the subscriber's office. The device looks and works like a typewriter and requires 
no more space or operating skill. Yet from this station, subscribers derive all 
the data processing power of KEYDATA's larger computer system in Watertown, Mas- · 
sachusetts. 
Dan and Alan Hootstein provide an excellent example of the KEYDATA operation. 
They operate a successful beauty supply house in Chelsea, Massachusetts. Like 
many small businessmen in the United States, the Hootsteins earn a good living. 
Until recently, however, they have had to pay dearly for the privilege. Alan 
Hootstein took over administrative control of his father's business eleven years 
ago; and, stnce tfiat time, the company has dramatically increased its volume and 
profi tabi 1 i ty. 
0 0ne of the reasons for our continued growth is the installation of a busi-
ness computer utility, which reduces our paperwork to a minimum and frees our 
time for other more important business activities, 11 say"s Alan Hootstein. 
Mr. Hootstein continues: 
Before we installed the KEYDATA system my brother and I were 
yirtually slaves to our business, working most evenings and 
weekends until midnight, sometimes later, to obtain the informa-
tton we required for the next day' s business. This work involved 
preparing and adding invoices, checking inventory, figuring 
salesmen's commissions, applying customers' discounts and analy-
/4 Otto Eckstein, "An Economic Information Utility," Modern Data, (Septem-






zing customers• activities in terms of sales. 
The volume of paperwork became impossible, and the long and 
arduous business days were taking their toll. Dan and I were 
always tired and grumpy, so much so that our families and emplo-
yees were also affected to the point that morale at home and in 
the office was at an all time low. 
Prior to installation of the system, the Hootsteins did not know the state 
of their OW'I cash position without a thorough analysis of the books. When they 
were confronted with tempting 11price off 11 offers and generous discounts, they 
generally purchased the items in an effort to save money, only to find out later 
that the products they purchased were well stocked at the time and the money 
spent could have been better used to purchase low stock items. 
KEYDATA has eliminated all of this second guessing, while improving the cash 
flow situation and the efficiency of the company operation . The Hootsteins also 
believe that KEYDATA has helped establish discipline within the company becau.se 
of the necessity to count and post incoming shipments correctly into the computer. 
Everything has to be done a certain way, everything has a system, and it is the 
system that keeps people busy and helps the company continue its growth./5 
These examples of 11computer utilities 11 serve to answer the question about 
feasibility and shed some light on the possibilities of a much broader scope for 
11infonnation utilities_.' As our society moves forward, institutions, no less 
than individuals, must adapt themselves to its pace. Such factors as pressures 
and shifts of populatton, new concepts in education, and higher standards of 
medtcal care are making demands unheard of a few short years ago on government, 
schools, and hospitals. 
IV. POTENTIAL OF THE COMPUTER UTILITY 
The computer is playing an increasingly significant role in response to 
soci"ety1 s onward rush. The Federal Government, for example, uses data processing 
systems in applications ranging from the Government Printing Office to the Nation-
al Institutes of Health, from the Department of Agriculture to the Federal Reserve 
Board and from tne Department of Defense to the Internal Revenue Service. In 
counties, cities, and states, the computer is applied to social services, pollu-
tfon monitori'ng, job matching, and law enforcement./6 
O In our high schools, junior colleges, and universities, education is bring-
ing the computer into the classrooms while applying EDP to complex administrative 
tasks. Hospttals are working to improve patient care while holding down costs 
with computer applications extending from patient billing and menu planning to 
cli'ntcal systems for EKG and chromosome analysis.JI 
/5 W. C. Christian, 11Businessmen Bank on the Computer Utility, 11 Data Sys-
tems News, (June, 1970), pp. 44. 
/6 L. F. Carter, 11Computers in Government: An Application's Overview,.' 
Government Data Systems, (November-December, 1970), pp. 28-33. 
/7 B. Hodes, 11Computers in Public Service - Government, Education, Medicine,11 
Data Processor, (December, 1970/January, 1971), pp. 4. 
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These new roles for the computer suggest areas where computer utilities would 
provide abundant new information resources which are not presently available . We 
are already witnessing 11a new monetary system" in which many banks are providing 
professional billing services to physicians, dentists, and lawyers. In this sys-
tem, patient infonnation is transmitted to the bank which then handles all book-
keeping, including billing the patients, depositing the receipts, compiling tax 
information, and crediting payments to the doctor's checking account. The suppo-
sedly conservative banking industry is also making liberal use of on-line teller 
terminals, audio response systems, and banking or financial networks. /.§. • 
In the not too distant future, it is very likely that most businesses will 
have si mple te rminals linking them electronically to a central information exchange. 
Each business could then make instantaneous credit checks and offer its customers 
the convenience of universal credit cards (11money keys11)./9 These cards would all 
but eliminate the need for currency, checks, cash register s , sales slips and change 
making. When inserted in the terminal, these cards would provide the sales clerk 
an indicatio n whether or not the customer's balance is adequate and would update 0 
the customer's balance automatically. Other credit entries such as payroll pay-
ments, benefits, dividends and gifts would be recorded similarly. Additionally, 
periodic account statements, figured automatically, would be forwarded directly 
via a private tenni nal. 
As time goes on, we can expect that the local financial utilities wi ll be 
interconnected to create a nationwide and, eventually, a worldwide network that 
will permit a customer to make money-key transactions no matter where he travels. 
As the utility networks grow and the cost of queries become trivially small, 
it is likely that consumers will come to depend more and more on the computer 
utility for infonnation concerning products and services of all kinds (computer-
ized shopping)./lQ_ 
Having examined the computer utility as it is today and a few of the innova-
tive ways in which it may be used in t he future, let us turn now to a considera-
tion of its possible impact on our society. 
V. PROBLEMS 
It requires no clairvoyance or extrasensory perception to see some of the 
dangers that might face us if certain capabilities of the computer utility were 
to be misdirected. Together, the various data files of the different networks--
medical, educational, financial, legal, law enforcement, etc.--could contain a 
complete record from birth until death of even the most private affairs of every- 0 
one. In the absence of adequate controls, there are obviously enonnous possibili-
ties for industrial espionage and even blackmail in such a situation . Worse still 
are the possiE>ilities for political repression inherent in a system in which one 
could not purchase so much as a stick of chewing gum without revealing one's iden-
tity · and wherea5outs to the central computer. Censorship is another spectre that 
is bound to haunt the operators of computer utilities for some time to come. 
/8 D. F. Parkhill, The Challenge of the Compute-Ut ility, Addison-Wesl ey Pub-
lishing Company, Reading, Massachusetts, 1966, pp. 155-156. 
/9 M. Greenberger, "Computers of Tomorrow,u Atlantic Monthly, (May, 1964), 
pp. 63:"67. 
/10 D. F. Parkhill, The Challenge of the Computer Utility, Addison-\~esley 




One of the impressions this paper is attempting to create is that the time 
has arrived when it is possible to consider computer power as a likely candidate 
for admission to the public-utility club in a legal sense. When this eventuality 
does in fact occur, the computer public utilities are likely to be influenced by 
some additional legal factors which are not necessarily encountered by other 
utilities. 
Privacy and Security 
One of these involves the use of the utility as an information depository 
serving many different customers. Here, it is essential that the utility take 
adequate steps to protect its customers1 material from loss or mutilation. 
Equally important is the responsibility of the utility for the protection cus-
tomer privacy and, thus, for preventing access to a customer1s files by unauthor-
ized persons. The magnitude of the hazards involved in any loss of file security 
will certainly impose a strong legal obligation upon the utility; but, beyond 
this, there is the matter of liability for damage in the event that the security 
is breached./11 
Closely connected with the file security problem is the individual 1 s right 
to privacy. Most industry spokesmen prefer to separate the issues of privacy and 
security. Privacy relates to the collection of data and the input to the compu-
ter from this viewpoint, and security relates to the safeguarding of this infor-
mation once it is installed into the machine. Privacy, then, becomes a social 
question, security a technical one. 
It is security which is the most easily solved of the two questions. No 
one doubts that operating systems can be developed which will go a long way in 
safeguarding entrance to the system by an unauthorized individual. Such systems, 
backed by legislation which would provide for both criminal and civil actions 
against the interloper, will necessarily be a part of the computer age of the 70's. 
Privacy is, by far, the more difficult part of the problem to solve. Most 
privacy exponents agree that it will require not only legislation, but an aware-
ness on the part of the individual who is seeking information to limit his sear-
ching and his questions to that information for which he has immediate need./]I 
The computer is not responsible for the invasion of privacy, except in the 
respect that it makes codification, control, and dissemination more efficient. 
It is this efficiency, however, that is in the end creating what Newsweek maga-
zine calls 11the death of privacy in the traditional sense. 11 
There is a distinct human tendency to use any resource simply for the sake 
of using it. Just as the man with a gun is more prone to use it, so, too, is 
the man with the information cannon. This problem is almost impossible to legis-
late against; it is in this area that the data processing professional, be he 
programmer, analyst, or manager, is going to have to make the lonely stand for 
the individual. 
The focus here has been on security and privacy as two of the largest pro-
blems facing implementation of a nation-wide computer utility. However, there 
/11 J . Rockford, "Privacy and the Computer," Data Systems News, (August-
September, 1970), pp. 11-12. 
/Jg_ Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
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are other serious legal aspects which are likely to cause trouble such as: 
l. The difficulties that arise because of the absolute 
dependence of a computer utility on conmunication 
faci 1 i ti es. 
2. The legal problems which are bound to happen since 
the decision of the United States Copyright Office that 
computer programs may be copyrighted . 
3. The whole question of the rates to be charged for the 
different kinds of services rendered by a computer utility. 
4. And fi nally the question of ownership and control./13 
I V. CONCLUSION 
The real problem that we face with automation lies very close in time. It O 
is. in fact, with us today, for it is concerned with the transition between our 
present situation and the automated world of the future. There is no sense in 
minimizing the problems that must be overcome if we are to successfully complete 
this transition. 
We are moving forward into an era where information processing will be avail-
able in much the same way that one buys electricity. For instance, the interac-
t i ve timesharing market was $10 million in 1965; climbed to $200 million in 1970; 
and is expected to rise to $1.5 billion by 1975./14 These facts plus the success 
of the information utilities already operating forecast a very bright future for 
the computer utility in spite of the problems which were pointed out. 
In conclusion, there is an urgent need for exhaustive study and analysis of 
the economic and social aspects of computer utilities and of the changes t hat their 
i ntroduction is likely to produce in our society. Here, of course, the subject 
of the computer utility broadens and merges with the myriad other cha 11 enges that 
are endemic to our modern society . 
/13 M. R. Wessel, "Computer Services and the Law,11 Business Automation, 
(November, 1970), pp. 48-50. 
/J.! Joseph Levy, "The Interact ive Time-Sharing Market," Computers and 
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TUE ~1ELA TI ONSH IP BETHE N BLACKS AND 
THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES 
by V. P. Sandall 
The au.tho1t ex.pioll.eti .the. hJ.1.d:011.y 06 :the 1teia:ti.0M/u,p be.tween 
biack-6 and :the Uru:ted Sta.:tu Aluned FOil.CU. He ex.ami.nu .the e66ec.-
-ti.veneM 06 -i.ntegJi.a-ti.on ,ln .the mili:talty and ex.pand.6 on how black 
.6(Ytv-i.cemc.n oe.ef. abou:t .thwi 1teia:Uon6lu.p W-i.tlt :the. mlli..t.alty. 
V. P. SANDALL~ T, MSC, USN: B.S., 1971, George Washington Uni-
versity; M.S. (Management), 1972, Naval Postgraduate School. 
Th-i.-6 pape.11. Wa.6 .&ubm-U:ted :to P1to6u.&01!. Senge.11. 601t GJi.oup and 
01!.gan-i.za:ti.ona.l Beha.v,i.011., MN 3121. 
11What they say in the Constitution about Freedom doesn1 t 
apply to blacks because our peopl e were slaves when they wrote 
it. The Bil l of Rights means nothing to Negroes." 
A Bl ack Soldier /1 
. -
There are three cogent reasons for examining the question of integration in 
the military. One is that the position of the black--his economic, social, and 
political status--is one of the most important issues in the United States today. 
The second is that, of al l institutions in the United States, the military estab-
lishment has the reputation of advancing the most rapidly in race relations since 
World War JI. The third reason is to be informed, in an objective, wel1 research-
ed manner, on an important aspect of the organization of which the author is a 
/1 C. V. Glines, 11Black vs. White." Armed Forces Management. Vol. 16, 







part, the Navy. 
The objective of this paper is to explore the history of the relationship 
between blacks and the military in the United States; to examine the effective-
ness of integration in the military; and to see how blacks feel about their 
relationship with the military, primarily the Navy. 
Historical review of the relationship between blacks and the U.S. Armed 
Forces presents an interesting study. 
Blacks were permitted to serve during the American Revolution despite 
several policy directives issued by Washington1 s headquarters to prevent black 
enlistment; issued because Southern slaveholders claimed their property was 
disappearing into the Army. These directives were repealed by the Continental 
Congress in 1776, at Washington's request./2 
From 1783 until 1860, political pressure generally denied military service 
to blacks. There were some exceptions during the War of 1812--blacks were 
utilized to relieve white manpower shortages. A handful participated in the 
Mexican War. 
At the beginning of the Civil War, Lincoln refrained from using blacks for 
fear of increasing hostility in the South and driving bqrder states out of the 
Union, even though a large number in urban centers of the North responded en-
thusiastically to his first call for volunteers. In 1861 there was a shortage 
of troops, and a few were allowed to enlist. In 1862, individual generals 
started enlisting blacks, forming them into separate units. While the War 
Department did not approve, only one Conmander (at Port Royal, South Carolina) 
was forced to disband his units./3 
With the Emancipation Proclamation, the Union allowed black enlistments./4 
Nevertheless, few blacks served in mixed units, and most black units had white-
officers. The expansion of the Navy, however, created a serious manpower short-
age, and blacks served aboard ships on an integrated basis until the end of the 
war. 
In 1865, the desperate Confederate Congress allowed black enlistments; 
days after the measure was passed, Lee surrendered and no blacks were ever 
inducted. 
After the war, the Republicans established four black units to maintain 
the blacks' rights to a position in the military. They were primarily concern-
ed with Indian fighting. During the 1870s, four blacks were appointed to West 
Point--three graduated. Three entered Annapolis--none graduated. During the 
Spanish-American War, 100 black Second Lieutenants were co1T1T1issioned because of 
a shortage of officers. Several of the black units saw combat; two units were 
part of Theodore Roosevelt's Rough Riders. 
At the turn of the Century, the radical Populist elements spread anti-black 
violence and encouraged rigid racial separation; this led to the Supreme Court's 
Plessy Decision, establishing the doctrine of separate-but-equal. 
World War I brought little improvement in black-military relations. Three 
hundred fifty thousand blacks were inducted (3 million were registered), but 
I£. Richard J. Stillman, Integration of the Negro in the U. S. Armed Forces. 
{New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 7. 
/1 Ibid., p. 10. 
/4 Milton R. Konvitz. A Century of Civil Rights. {New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1961), p. 42. 
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11the conditions that confronted them in the military were humiliating."/5 
There were several reasons for this, including the political reality that the 
Wilson Administration was dependent on Southern Democratic power and also Booker 
T. Washington1 s phi losophy of socia l inactivism for the black. 
Basic problems wi thi n the Army and Navy included the geographic location 
of bases (large black units stationed in the South); external pressures which 
forced the services to develop division-size black units, the 92nd and 93rd 
Infantry Divisions; and the inadequate number and quality of black officers. 
Returning to a peace keeping force in the 1920s, the armed forces reduced black 
units to minimal strength and eliminated recruitment of blacks. 
By 1940, only 5 black off icers ·and 5,000 black enlisted men were left in 
the segregated Army units; the Navy Department accepted them only as stewards; 
the Marine Corps accepted none. The system used by the armed forces during World 
War II had four characteristics: 1) blacks were excluded from many jobs in the 
services; 2) large segregated units were formed (although WWI experience showed 
0 these were less effective than integrated units); 3) their role was primarily 
support rather than combat; and 4) they were under-represented in leadership 
positions in the Department of Defense. Despite these problems, by V-J Day 
3 million blacks had registered for service; 695,264 had been inducted, and 
495,950 had gone overseas./6 Not until after WWII did the blacks attack the 
segregation policies of t he-military. 
In 1944, James Forrestal succeeded Frank Knox as Secretary of the Navy, 
reforming the Navy Department's racial policy-- 11The Navy accepts no theories of 
racial differences in abi l i ty, but expects that every man wearing its uniform be 
trained and used in accordance with his maximum individual abilities. 11/?_ Despite 
refor h,S instituted by forrestal, in September 1945 more than 85% of Navy blacks 
were stewards. This was due in part to the difficulty of attracting black per-
sonnel to what had been known as a segregated organization. 
Post-war, the mi1itary establishment seemed to ignore black aspirations for 
equality for three reasons: 1) the so1dier 1 s ingrained belief in b1ack combat 
inferiority; 2) the belief that integration was a political, not a military 
problem; and 3) the Pentagon was dominated by military, not civilian leaders. 
In 1946, the Gillem Report, 11Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar 
Army Policy 11 , recommended: 
l. Maintainance of a 10-per-cent quota for Negroes 
2. Employment of Negroes in regimental-size units or smaller 
3. The promise of expansion of the number of Negro officers 
4. Utilization of skilled NCOs in overhead and special units, permitting 
limited integration 
5. Assignment of Negro units to locales where sentiments were favorable 0 
to colored personnel 
6. Integration of on-base buses, recreational facilities, and officers• 
messes, where this policy would not infringe on local custom./!!_ 
/§_ Richard J Stillman, op. cit . , p. 12. 
/§_Ibid., p. 27. 
IL Ibid., p. 30. 




The Gillem Board recommendations were not implemented, because the military 
hoped that their status quo philosophy would be tolerated. 
The first attempt at permanent integration was brought about by a civilian--
Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, who ordered integration of the Navy in 
1946. Although this was accomplished on paper, the Navy continued to have dif-
ficulty in persuading the black community that reforms had really taken place. 
In July 1948, President Truman signed Executive Order 9981. requiring equal 
opportunity in the Armed Forces, regardless of race, after threats of "mass 
civil disobedience. 11/2_ It was primarily a political move by Truman to gain black 
votes on Election Day. 
The Fahy Committee (the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and 
Opportunity in the Armed Forces), formed in 1949, succeeded in bringing civilian 
views into the military establishment. On April 24, 1949, Secretary of Defense 
Louis B. Johnson announced that detailed proposals for ending racial separation 
were required from each service, giving deadlines for each service. The Air 
Force and Navy programs immediately gained the Secretary's approval, but the Army 
plans remained limited--in May, 1950, Army personnel were still in segregated 
units. 
The Korean War brought integration to the Army as commanders found it was 
the best way to run the Army--all-black units were less effective than integrated 
ones. So, integration was achieved in the Army "because of the pragmatic demands 
of the professional soldier, not because of any ideals of colored equality. 11/lQ 
President Kennedy set up the Gessel Committee on Equal Opportunity in the 
Armed Forces. Their work was largely ineffective, because they left solutions 
resting on ill-equipped base commanders and they failed to see their recommendations 
through. At the same time, however, Kennedy established an office at Department of 
Defense level, devoted to the black's concerns. Through the efforts of this office, 
and Secretary of Defense McNamara, measures to halt off-base housing discrimination 
were instituted. 
For the man newly entering the armed forces in 1972, it is hard to conceive 
that the military was once one of America's most segregated institutions. Today, 
color barriers at the formal level are absent throughout the military establish-
ment. Equal treatment regardless of race is official policy in such non-duty 
facilities as swimming pools, chapels, barber shops, post exchanges, movie theaters, 
snack bars, and dependent housing, as well as the more strictly military endeavors 
involved in assignments, promotions, and general living conditions. Moreover, 
white personnel are often supervised by black seniors. 
In addition, the military now implements the policy of equal opportunity by 
exerting pressure on local communities where segregated patterns affect military 
personnel. They also exert control over applicants for employment and personnel 
of firms under contract with the Department of the Navy./11 In this regard, the 
military has been potent and effective in eliminating segregated housi ng in areas 
adjacent to military communities and in public facilities. The official policy is 
expressed in an Equal Opportunity Institution as ..• "Race, color, creed, national 
origin, and sex are not considerations affecting the value of quality of Navy per-
sonnel and we have the full responsibility to insure that our people receive equal 
treatment on and off base, independent of these factors. 11/J_g_ 
/'}_Ibid., p. 39-40. 
llQ Ibid., p. 55. 
/11 DOD Directive 1100.15 
- DOD Directive 1338.15 
SecNav Instruction 5350. lOA. 
/J_g_ SecNav Instruction 5350.lOA. 
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In brief, military life is apparently characterized by an interracial 
equality of a quantity and kind that is seldom, if ever, found in any other 
major institution of American society. 
"Whites can never understand blacks because they have 
never experienced the same humiliation." 
A Black Sol cli~r /]1 
In spite of the previously documented progress in integration, racial unrest 
in the armed services has· accelP.rated in t he last decade. Since the early 1960's, 
there have been numerous racial clashes on bases of all services, in adjacent 
civilian towns and cities, in every area of the world where the United States main-
tains mi litary forces. Until recently, most of these incidents received litt l e 
publicity. For example, in 1962 the author was a hospital corpsman attached to 
the 3rd Marine Division, based on Okinawa. Riots of serious proportion broke out . 
The villages of Kin and Kosa were subjected to burning, attack, and vandalism 0 from disgruntled blacks who objected to the whites-only policy of these villages. 
Blacks were restricted by social convention to the •1Four Corners" area while on 
liberty. The situation became so bad that liberty was restricted to certain day-
light hours, civilian clothes privileges were withdrawn, and base cl ubs had to be 
heavily policed. There were numerous injuries, and at leas t onesuspicious death . 
To the author's knowledge, these riots were never reported in the U. S. press. 
As Yarmolinsky says, "Racial problems had been ignored or covered up in the past. "fil 
More recently, despite the many positive signs of black involvement in the 
armed services, disruptions have occurred at military bases in the U. S. and in 
Vietnam. In the summer of 1969 at Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, a cross was burn-
ed on the lawn of a black civilian employee. The riot at long Binh stockade, out-
side of Saigon, in September, 1968, was another racial incident. One white soldier 
was killed and several others were wounded after a black "take-over" of the stock-
ade./15 
In February, 1970, according to Army sources, a number of black soldiers 
wayl aid and viciously assaulted several white soldiers making telephone calls from 
an outs i de booth on Ft. Benning's Kel ley Hill, a remote area reserved for the 197th 
Brigade. Military police reported brawls along racial lines with increasing fre-
quency as young, marauding blacks took over the hi l l after sundown. Whites, walk-
ing alone or in pairs, were set upon almost on a nightly basis, post officials re-
ported. Word qui ck ly spread that 11Ke 11 ey Hi 11 may be 1 ong to the command in the day 
time, but it belongs to the Spec 4 after dark . 't The increas i ng number of unprovoked 
assaults seemed to prove it . /16 
In July, 1969, Cpl. Edward E. Bankston, a thrice wounded Vietnam veteran, died 
at Camp LeJeune from massive head injuries sustained in an apparently unprovoked ) 
assault by a group of black Marines. In the series of rhubarbs that followed, fifteen 
white Marines were injured at the hands of a group estimated to be thirty to fifty 
blacks of the 2nd Marine Division. Between January and August of 1969, over 160 
assa ults, muggings, and robberies occurred on base./17 
Ill C. V. Glines, op. cit . , p. 21. 
/J.iAdam Yarmolinsky. The Military Establishment : Its Impacts on American 
Society . (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 346. 
/1.§_ Ibid., p. 345 . 
/li C. V. Gl ines, op. cit., p. 20. 
Ill.. Ibid . , p. 20. 
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In August, 1969, following press and Congressional interest in several 
disorders which were alleged to have occurred on military bases in the United 
States, the Army General Staff requested major commanders to submit a report 
of significant incidents with racial overtones which had occurred during the 
preceeding year. As a result, 129 such incidents were reported to have occurr-
ed in the U.S. alone./18 
Indicative of serious doubt concerning military integration are the charges 
of genocide that have been leveled at the military establishment by Civil 
Rights groups. Their concern has been the disproportionate concentration of 
battle casualities among the lower socio-economic groups. Thomas A. Johnson, 
black reporter for the New York Times, reports that of the 6,644 deaths in Viet-
nam for 1961-66, 14.6% were black. During 1967, 13.5% of the 9,378 casualities 
were black. As of April 1970, roughly 9.9% of the troops in Vietnam were black, 
but 14% of the total deaths were blacks./19 These figures are consistent with 
research findings from the Korean War. -
O There are several reasons for these disproportionate casualty figures. 
According to Johnson, blacks make up an estimated 20% of combat troops and more 
than 25% of high risk elite Army units, such as paratroops. The acceptance, 
even the seeking of danger and high risk by blacks is related to prestige, status 
seeting and fulfillment,denied blacks in civilian conmunities in the U.S. Sub-
stantial numbers of blacks have chosen to make the military a career, attracted 
by job security, pay, opportunity for advancement, and the absence of overt dis-
crimination. It is an indictment that blacks prefer service overseas to that in 
their homeland and that they feel driven to volunteer for high risk elite combat 
units in order to gain the status and prestige denied them at horn~. 
Black anger and black separations seem to be on the increase .' Paradoxically, 
the accomplishments of the armed forces--in particu .1ar, the achievement of racial 
integration without violence or undue social stress--have provided a social ex-
perience that has strengthened and validated the demands of both black and white 
civil rights leaders . Both blacks and whites have perceived the gains the military 
has made and see no reason why absolute equality can not be achi.eved. As civil 
rights leaders in the civilian community became more vocal during the 1960s, the 
black individual became more knowledgeable about what was possible. He brought 
these demands with him into the military and would not accept the highly structured 
way of miUtary life \'lhich rejected attempts by individuals or groups to establish 
or maintain separate identtties within the system. Since this highly structured 
military is seen by the black as heavily dependent on traditions, white attitudes, 
and cultural identification, he regards as racist any attempts to make him conform 
to the expected military model. The noncommissioned officer or officer tends to see 
this rejection of conformity with the military model as ar rogance and, for the 11good11 
0 of the service," attempts to bring the black soldier into line. These actions fur-
ther polarize the two groups. 
In enlisted men's messes, in clubs and dining halls, one can observe black 
military men segregating themselves. In Vietnam, one could find Negro-only clubs, 
"from combination ... [brothel] and truck-wash emporiums outside Danang, to bars on 
Saigon's waterfront. 11/20 
The incidents previously described are indicative of the large number of con-
frontations in military situations in the past few years. 
Yarmolinsky notes that Albert B. Fitt, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Man-
power under President Johnson, has pointed out that military integration has been 
mainly institutional. Fitt stated in an interview, 11In all signif i cant respects and 
/18 James M. Gibson, "Seminar on Racial Relations." Military Review. Vol. 50 
(July,1970), p. 13. 
/12. Adam Yarmolinsky, op. cit., p. 347. 
/20 Ibid . , p. 347. 17 
all ways that can y1eld to object i ve analysis, i.n all matters over which we have 
any control, integration works ... but ... I would not suggest that in social. non-
official conduct there is absence of al l prejudice .t'/21 Indeed, the evidence 
suggests that the military has a long way to go. -
11Prejudice against blacks begins in the white man's home. 
Whites must teach their kids that they're no better than blacks ... 
A Black Soldier/li 
In 1969, the Marine Corps took a deep introspective look at itself . The 
situation with the 2nd Marine Division at Camp leJeune was particularly distres-
sing to Marine commanders, because blac k fighting men had proven their courage 
in combat. Indeed, one-fifth of the Medal of Honor awards for deeds in Vietnam 
"above and beyond" have gone to blacks. There seemed to be no logical reason 
for the sudden spate of vicious attacks stemming fr om racial differences. 
Major General Michael P. Ryan, USMC. Conmanding General of the 2nd Marine 
Division set about finding out the extent of unrest among his troops by having 
battalion commanders hold leadership discussions to determine the depth of black 
hostility . Young (under 24) black and white Marines did speak out. White Marines 
in the same age bracket as the blacks tended to side with the blacks. The fol-
lowing conclusions were drawn from the sessions: 
l. Bl ack men resent terms that carry the connotations of prejudice; they 
prefer "black marine". 
2. Black and white marines gather in racia l groups, each suspicious of the 
other. 
3. Mustaches help blacks prove they are a 11man11 • 
4. The "Afro" is in for blacks; they resent compliance with white standards 
-- their hair is basically different. 
5. The black marine is especially sensitive to menial tasks not assigned 
to whites. 
6. Display of the Confederate Flag is irritating. 
7. The black marine concludes that he gets less off-base privileges than 
his white counterparts. 
8. The clenched fist represents a sense of unity, an esprit, and a lawful 
aspiration . 
9. The use of black officers and nonconmissioned officers out of the chain of 
conmand to dispose of problems involving black mar ines is especially re-
sented; it implies the white l eaders don't want to get involved./23 
Ryan followed the unstructured leadership discussions with an attitude survey 
which was administered to 1,153 black and white marines representing 10% of the 
divisions population. The survey was not available to this author; however, the 
following conclusions relating to racial differences were published in Armed Forces 
Management: 
l. White sergeants had the most unfavorable attitude of any group and 
their attitudes grew worse after being at Camp LeJeune for more than 
two years . 
/fl Ibid., p. 347. 
/'l:J:..C. V. Glines,QE_. cit . , p. 21. 




2. The attitude of white corpora1s and black sergeants worsened the 
1onger they were at LeJeune. 
3. B1ack corpora1s did not believe that white officers want black 
marines in their command, but black sergeants disagreed. 
4. Whi1e the majority of b1ack and white marines agreed that the races 
do not understand each other, this attitude was held more strongly 
by the b1ack marine./24 
There are striking parallels between the Ryan survey and one done by CDR 
Thomas C. Groce, USNR. In February, 1971, CDR Groce sent his survey to repre-
sentative Navy commands who were requested to have blacks assigned to their 
command, complete the questionnaire on a voluntary basis and return them by 
April, 1971. There were 11,033 returns; a total of 7,346 usable questionnaires 
resulted--the remainder being incomplete, or not answered, or having portions 
missing by design or unintentionally. 
The most interesting and perhaps unexpected results of this survey are the 
sharp dichotomies in responses between those blacks over 24 years old and those 
younger (from 17 to 24). Some of the responses are: 
Superior relationships: Relations with supervisors pose some major 
problems to over 26% of males under 24, and some problems to 
nearly 20% of the total. 
Subordinate relationships: There is little or no problem. 
Social problems: 70% of the sample share the opinion that they do 
not have social problems which are connected with officiai duties. 
However, nearly 30% of the males under 24 have some problem in 
this area. 
Inservice training: Nearly 40% of the males under 24 reported problems 
with rate training compared to slightly over 32% of the females. 
Rules and regulations: Knowledge of Navy rules and regulations poses 
problems to over 30% of males under 24, while little or no problem 
to over 90% of males over 24. 
Assigned duties: Nearly 75% of the total sample have little or no 
problem with assigned duties, however, there is a greater percentage 
of males under 24 who do have such problems. 
Advancement opportunities: The major problem areas connected with ad-
o vancement exists with females. Approximately 35% of the group and a 
comparable percentage of males under 24 share this opinion. 
Advancement success: Over 72% of the tota1 sample believe their promotion-
al success to be average or above. Nearly 28% of the males show some 
differences of opinion, believing their success to be below average or 
poor. 
Navy image, prior and past enlistment: There are two contrasting views 
on how the Navy is rated. Males over 24 constitute the majority of 
opinions, rating the image of the Navy favorably. Females and males 
under 24 view the image of the Navy unfavorably. 
Emphasis concerning blacks: In answer to the request to specify appropri-
ate responses if you feel there are other areas that have not been 
given enough attention or emphasis concerning b~acks, the following 
emerged as·ttie most conmon (70%) responses: 
/24 Ibid., p. 22. 19 
1. Off-base housing. 
2. Comoetence of superiors. 
3. Ethnically ori ented food and products in the exchange and 
commissary. 
4. More black officers. 
5. More important responsibilities. 
6. Trust from superiors. 
7. Better communication with superiors. 
8. More individual recognition for good work. 
9. Ensuring that young blacks can ident i fy wi t h the Navy prior 
to enlistment. 
10. Presenting the Navy in black communities. 
11. Ending racial slurs and injustices. 
12. More money. 
Z-Grams: This quest ion was asked--CNO has recently promulgated policies 
designed to improve conditions for blacks in the Navy; IF you are 
aware of such policies, how do they affect you? 
Most cormnon (70%) responses: 
1. Favorable. 
2. Recognition of blacks as human beings. 
3. Improves off-base living conditi ons. 
4. Improves social relationships. 
5. Gives security in Navy for all races. 
6. A feeling of belonging to the Navy. 
7. Recognition of blacks as individuals for doing a good job. 
Improvement i n Race Relations: The most common (70%) responses to the 
questions, 11In what specific area do you thi nk there has or has not 
been improvement in race relations since your entry into the Navy?" 
Has: 
1. Senior to junior rel ationships. 
2. Living conditions aboard ship. 
3. Cormnunications with peers and subordinates . 
4. Duties asstgned to blacks. 
5. Rate t raining and special programs. 
Has not: 
1. Co1T1Tiands do not implement CNO's pol icies. 
2. Communications with superiors . 
3. Double standards towards blacks. 





Navy career: The most common responses to a request to exp1ain why you do 
or do not plan to make the Navy a career are: 
Do: 
1. CNO's favorab1e policies. 
2. To improve conditions for b1acks. 
3. Unity for a11 races. 
Do not: 
1. Not enough black officers. 
2. Poor off-base living conditions. 
3. General discriminations and racial slurs. 
4. Social relationships. 
5. Incompetence of superiors. 
6. Financial. 
7. Inconsistent policies toward blacks./25 
11Blacks know all about whites because all they've ever read about or 
heard of is the white man's culture. But whites really don't know any-
thing about blacks." 
A Black So1dier /26 
Three aspects of the prob1em of integration in the mi1itary seem to emerge as 
more significant than others. One is the peculiar hierarchal power structure of the 
military which is predicated on stable and patterned relationships and the account-
ability of members for effective perfonnance. Failures in policy implementation can 
be pinpointed, and it is to an individual's personal interest to insure the effective 
implementation of the policy. 
Hair cuts, soul music, mustaches, opportunities for education and inservice 
training, assigned duties, special provision of ethnica1ly oriented foods and products 
in the exchange and commissary, to a large extent housing, and compliance with CNO's 
policies are all issues of control~ The military establishment is particularly 
effective in dealing with and deciding upon such issues quickly. It has done so in 
the past and there is no reason to believe that the military will not continue to be 
effective in these areas. 
The second is the "generation gap." It is important to remember that the mili-
0 tary establishment was desegregated before the current militant civil rights drive 
Qained momentum in 1964. and those who were in the service, both black and white, were 
in!>lllated from much of the rise in black militancy in civilian life. But the rousing 
eloquence of such black spokesmen as Ma1colm X, Stokey Carmichael, Eldridge Cleaver 
and H. Rap Brown affected the attitudes of young black men. While not conc1usive, 
there is some evidence that suggests that during this period a polarization occurred 
in which young blacks and whites accepted and even welcomed increasing1y strident and 
militant leadership for civil rights; coincidently, older whites and some older blacks 
retrenched, falling back to demands for moderation and restraint expressed in "law and 
order" as the appropriate response. In part, this may be the reason for the sharp 
dichotomy of responses and attitudes of blacks and whites 24 or younger and those who 
are older. One of the reasons often suggested for the generation gap is lack of 
effective communication. 
/25 Thomas C. Groce. Major Prob1ems and Morale of Blacks in the U.S. Navy. 
(An unpublished paper, 1971). 
/26 C. V. Glines, op. cit., p. 21. 21 
The third aspect is communication. This involves communication of attitudes 
and aspirations; of the accomplishments of the military on black behalf; of 
opportunities; of rules and regulations; of information to combat misconception 
and false rumors. Report after report continues to drive home the message that 
our problem is that people don1 t communicate. This failure to communicate leads 
to lack of understanding. 
It is the lack of understanding that gives rise to the more subtle and social 
forms of discrimination--the grafitti on rest room walls, the telling of jokes with 
racial overtones, lack of trust and responsibility, racial epithets, double stand-
ards, assignment of menial duties, and other injustices. The spirit with which 
policies are implemented and complied with can not be legislated. Social relation-
ships are not generally thought to be a function of obedience to orders. But, 
through understanding, brought about by frequent, personal, effective communication, 
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TFX MISTAKES: TODAY'S SOLUTIONS 
by R. L. Kiem 
The au..tholL :t.aku an in-depth look at the p1toblem~ 
~Wlltou.ncU.ng .the c.ontli.oveJUiial TFX P 1togJt.am o 6 .the 1960 '~ 
and at what c.an be done. today :t.o p1teven.t a 11.eoc.c.u.Menc.e. 
R. L. KIEM, LCDR, USN; S.S., 1962, University of 
Florida; Candidate for M.S. in Management. 
TeNn pape.lL ~ubm.l:tted :t.o P1to6u~o1t HolL:t.on 601t Ve.6e.Me 
RuoWl.c.e AUoc.a.Uon, MN 3170. 
"Almost unnoticed, a sweeping change of far reaching significance 
has been quietly effected by the Secretary of Defense -- a change so 
important it will affect the career of every naval officer."/! The 
O change referred to is "Program Packaging," an outline for redistrib-
ution of the military services budgets. 
In 1956, Dr. James R. Killian, in testimony before the Symington 
Committee, predicted that "the military task no longer divides up 
neatly into three mission areas defined by the vehicle the fighting 
man rides in •.•• but requires new functional military organizations"; 
/1 Captain Harry C. White, USN, and LCDR obert J. Massey, USN, 
"Program Packaging -- Opportunity and Peril," Naval Institute Proceeding 
(Dec., 1961}, p. 23. 
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first, to develop weapons systems "w'tthout wastage of manpoijer and 
resources and unprof'ttable dupli.catton of effort, and, secondly, 
to manage them in terms of th.e.lr wholeness as system~. 11/'l:.. 
Program packaging was the Department of Defense answer in 1961 
to Dr. Kill'(an's testimony. Service missions were to be determ'ined 
on the basis of cost versus effecti.veness rather than the tra-
ditional, arbitrary, annual dole from the Department of Defense. 
As an example, costs and effecttveness of a system, such as the TFX 
(Tactical Fighter Experimental), was to be compared with a package 
of alternatives representing the natural mission which must be ac-
complished to defend the Untted States and carry out her policies. 
The TFX would compete with other means of neutralizing targets and 
include as part of its price the 11cost of airfields, training schools c 
and all other logisti'cs back-up required to keep it mission ready. 11/~. 
The concept of program packaging met its first major test as 
Defense Secretary McNamara ttacked the problem of developing a new 
ai.rcraft to replace a rapidly ageing fighter capability for the U. S. 
mi. litary. It was intended that the TFX would replace the Mc Donnel 1 
F-4 Phantom during the latter part of the 1960's and remain the 
primary fighter well into the l970's. 
September 11, 1962, marked the end of a 14-month competitive 
phase in which Boeing Aircraft Company and General Dynamics Corp-
oration sought a contract for the TFX. During the succeeding month, 
Boeing Aircraft Company received the unanimous endorsement of the 
joint Air Force - Navy Source Selection Board, a joint services 
Evaluation Group, the Air Force Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval 
Operations, Secretaries of both the Air Force and Navy, and a host 
of lesser military and civilian technical experts closely associated 
with the TFX procurement process. 
The Department of Defense, on 21 November, publicly announced 
selection of General Q(namics Corporation as the contractor for 
production of 22 TFX aircraft with a cost estimated at $439 million./4 
Historically, selection of General Dynamics marked the first time in -
which a civilian Defense Secretary had overruled the advice of his 
military experts on a major procurement decision analyses, changes 
which all branches of the military were ill-prepared to accept. 
It Ibid, p. 24. 
/1 Ibid, p. 30. 
/4 Robert J. Art, The TFX Decision: McNamara nd the Military 






The TFX in 1962 was potentially the largest procurement contract 
ever let by the Department of Defense for a single aircraft. It was the 
first major procurement decision for Secretary McNamara after his as-
sumption of office in January, 1961. 
For those individuals outside the highest decision levels in the 
Department of Defense, for the press, and even for the ultimate bene-
factors (Navy and Air Force), it appeared that Secretary McNamara 
simply ignored the advice of virtually hundreds of technical experts who 
expected a rubber-stamped approval of their reconmendation. Criticism 
of the decision quickly led to an eight-year Senate Investigation as 
well as public and private questions which implied that the integrity 
of both military and civilian leaders within the Defense Department were 
suspect. 
Why Study the TFX? 
Later in this paper it will be pointed out that all of the inno-
vations which Secretary McNamara brought to the Pentagon have not com-
pletely solved the military procurement problems. Decisions in 1972 
are still being forced out of poorly developed data similar to that 
which was evident in support of many TFX decisions. Failures of the 
TFX led to wide-spread public awareness and disgust for military "cost 
overruns," disgust which has gained remarkable momentum over the past 
decade. The inadequacies of the 1962 procurement selection process 
should vividly demonstrate the need for a systematic, analytical 
selection process in 1972. The Department of Defense Office of Systems 
Analysis (OSA) was a poorly marketed coTT111odity when it was conceived in 
the early 19601s. The junior military officer of that period is now 
moving into responsibilities for buying major military hardware today. 
And unless that officer can justify the need for systems analysis as a 
decision making tool, he will probably react to OSA as many military 
officers did then. The Office of Systems Analysis appeared, in 1965, 
to be another imposition in the procurement process which was forced 
down the military's throats. 
Analysts have attempted for almost a decade to develop procedures 
for estimating military program costs; yet, today, military cost overruns 
continue to make headlines almost daily. Inabilities to measure cost 
for the TFX closely parallel the problems faced by the military manager 
who controls modern procurement programs. If the military manager 
cannot logically and intelligently explain the stigmas of "cost overruns," 
he stands to lose the empathy of his civilian counterpart. The military 
officer who negates the value of that civilian support, indeed has a 
long education ahead of him if he is to develop as an effective, success-
ful military manager. The importance of civilian support grows ex-
ponentially as moves are made toward implementation of an all-volunteer 
force in July, 1973. 
Beginning of the IFX. 
The TFX concept began in 1959 as the Air Force Tactical Air Conmand 
described its need for a high performance fighter aircraft capable of 
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operating from ill-prepared, forward overseas bases. Specifications 
demanded that the aircraft be capable of performing a low altitude 
(tree-top) weapons delivery 11dash11 mission in addition to performing 
a 3,300 mile transoceanic ferry mission. Ii The incompatabilit i es 
of these two missions implied that the aircraft must employ the variable 
wing concept: virtually no sweep for slow, long range requirements 
and a radical wing sweep for low altitude, high speed flight. Ad-
ditionally, the demand for long range flight dictated the need for a 
large heavy aircraft capable of carrying maximum fuel. 
The variable wing concept fell considerably short of the U.S. 
aircraft industry's "state of the art 11 in 1959. Although minimal 
prototype flight testing had been conducted, substantial doubts existed 
that a military application of the variable incidence wing would ever ( 
be successful. Development costs were considered prohibitive. It was 
felt that radical changes in the wing structure during flight would 
substantially derrogate aircraft stability to unacceptable parameters. 
"Outgoing President Dwight Eisenhower decided the two projects 
(both high dollar affairs) were neither so urgent nor so far along the 
road that they ~ould not be killed. Both were halted and the problem 
dropped into Democratic laps. 11/6 
Enter 11The New Frontier". 
Defense Secretary :~::Namara began work on the TFX shortly after his 
appointment in January, 1961. He was quick to express his concern for 
the inactivity of past Defense Secretaries and forecast active leader-
ship of his department through the succeeding years. 
Like President Kennedy, Secretary McNamara was particularly con-
cerned that the United States had historical ly devoted its major defense 
efforts toward combat in a nuclear envirorvnent. Despite the rapid 
acceleration of nuclear weapons stockpiles worldwide, they accurately 
forecast the possibility of U.S. involvement in a protracted war. As 
a result, they jointly developed the theory of 11flexible response, 11 II. 
designed to provide the United States with the alternatives of meeting 
aggression short of resorting to full nuclear war or doing nothing. 
/5 Hearings on the TFX contract investigation held before the 
Permanent Subco11111ittee on Investigations of The Senate Committee on 
Government Operations, 88th Congress, First Session, Februar1 - November, 
1962. (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1963-70), p. 842. 
Hereafter known in this report as TFX INVESTIGATION l or _g_, correspon-
ding respectively to the 1963 or 1970 hearings 
/6 Hal Bamford, 11What Managers Can Learn from TFX," Armed Forces 
Mabagement, vol. IX {Jan., 1963), p. 16 





Secretary McNamara lso introduced basic economic philosophies into 
the operati .on of the Defense Department. The phrase 11cost-effectiveness 11 
quickly became a house-hold word throughout the defense establishment, 
even if its interpretation was poorly defined by its users . . From econ-
omic theory, he applied the logic of choice as he sought to achieve the 
most efficient use of scarce resources with minimum waste. /8 
Secretary McNamara demanded that costs for programs be established 
before decisions were made on their adoption. "Strategy should determine 
the size of the defense budget rather than budget determining strategy. 11 /2._ 
He looked closely at several past major military procurement deci&ions 
and learned that in 12 programs, the average cost variance approximated 
3.2. In other words, program cost overruns often approached 220% of the 
cost originally predicted. 
Procurement contracts came under similar close scrutiny under 
McNamara's guidance. During the decades of the 19401s and l950's, the 
Defense Department had customarily let Cost-Plus-Fixed Fee (CPFF) 
contracts which seldom demanded binding target cost for the seller. 
Maximum or minimum costs were rarely specified and the buyer agreed 
to reimburse seller for all costs incurred in filling the contract. 
The buyer had little incentive to minimize cost; the seller need only 
submit a low bid, win the development contract, and be assured of 
recouping losses during the production phase. Development and pro-
duction were normally covered under separate contract negotiations. 
Secretary McNamara insisted that firm fixed price contracts, "imag-
inatively conceived and well-executed could benefit both industry and 
DOD -- more profits for the former; more economy and effective 
military hardware for the latter. 11 /10 
Secretary McNamara lso attempted to dispel the myth that innovation 
and invention could not be costed; a myth which, he claimed, gained 
widespread support in the 1940's and 19501s. Similarly, he attempted 
to work closely with industry to develop mutual contract incentive 
programs which served to remove much of the risk that was customarily 
borne by the government. 
These were many of the procurement innovations developed in DOD 
during the early portion of the TFX project. Secretary McNamara en-
visioned great savings with the purchase of one aircraft for all branches 
of the military. He also felt that if differences in the same aircraft 
were necessary to meet individual service requirements, the design 
which had the greatest commonality of parts would ultimately result in 
the least cost. 
After one month in office, Secretary McNamara directed a joint 
military study which would produce an aircraft to meet the needs of all 
military branches. Just as quickly, the military began to resist the 
production of one aircraft with the excuse that each service would be 
/8 .... "What Tying Dollars to Military Decisions Means to Defense 
Management,11 Armed Forces Management, vol. IX (November, 1962), p. 89. 
/2. Art, .QQ_. Cit., p. 30. 
/10 Richard E. Biedenbinder and William G. Ireson, "Incentive 
Contracts: Genuine Benefits or Hoax," Armed Forces Management, 
Vol. IX (October, 1962), p. 62, 
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forced to accept a compromise weapons system./}l The military felt 
certain that any compromise would result in a relative step backwards. 
The Nav,r descri_bed i.ts requi.rements for a fi_gh.ter with long loi.ter 
capabihty coupled wi_th a high powered missile system designed to 
prov;_de force defense for i.ts seagotng fleet. Nav_y requirements ran 
counter to those of the Ai.r force which sought to develop a large, 
high speed fi.ghter. Considerable compromi.se was needed to meet the 
requirements of both services . As the Defense Department Research 
and Engi.neering pointed out, the Marine Corps si.mply could not justify 
use of a high performance fi.ghter aircraft in its role of air support 
to combat ground troops. In May, 1961, Secretary McNamara conceded the 
fact that one aircraft for all military branches was not justifiable, 
but he felt strongly that the Navy and Air Force could develop a 
satisfactory bi-service fighter./12 
After eight months of haggling between Navy and Air Force, Sec-
retary McNamara nd his close defense advisors enforced an agreement on 
convnon aircraft specifications. Requirements were sent to the air-
craft industry on l September, with the demand that bids be returned 
by 1 December, 1961. McNamara believed that the two services "attempted 
to use technological unknowns as an excuse for justifying years of out-
moded tradition."/13 Resistance to the bi-service aircraft remained 
strong in both theNavy and the Air Force. 
Nine companies participated in the first competative bidding phase./14 
A joint Navy-Air Force Evaluation Group concluded that all bids were 
unsatisfactory because or the technological uncertainties involved. 
Some blame was attributed to an inordinately short bidding period. The 
evaluation group did conclude that the General Dynamics Corporation/Grumman 
Aircraft Corporation team and the Boeing Aircraft Company proposals 
were significantly better than all others received on l December and, 
in an attempt to expedite further design and production, recommended 
selection of Boeing Company./15 The Source Selection Board (the next 
higher echelon in the then existing selection process) overruled the 
Evaluation Group's proposal by suggesting the award of additional study 
contracts to Boeing and General Dynamics. The second study was approved 
by Secretary McNamara for the period 31 January to 1 May, 1962. 
Although the Source Selection Board and the Evaluation Group 
concurred with the selection of Boeing after the second competition, 
both service secretaries reconmended a third period of study because 
of the Navy's dissenting vote that all proposals failed to meet aircraft 
/ll TFX Investigation, l, p. 7. 
/lf. TFX Investigation£, p. 1466. 
/ .11 Art, .QP_. cit. , p. 53 
/14 Of the nine companies, six participated in team bids: Lockheed 
Aircraft Corp., Boeing Co., North American Aviation, Repub1ic Aviation-
Chance Vought, General Dynamics - Grulllllan, and McDonnell - Douglas. 





carrier sui.tabi:li.ty requirements. /l§_ The thi.rd peri.od ( to correct 
defi:ci:encies) was approved for only three weeks, following whi.ch the 
Navy sti:11 refused commi:ttme.nt to a joi:nt project. /IL Secretaries 
Korth and Zukert asked for a fourth. 60-day study period, speci. fyi ng 
a mi.nimum of 45 days for thorough evaluatton. During thi.s period, the 
Navy and Atr force were authorized to work directly with Boeing and 
General Dynami.cs· -- a move that was unprecedented in Military procurement 
competitive bidding. The unaminous decision to select Boeing as the 
TFX development contractor followed the fourth bidding period on 11 
September, 1962. On 21 November, 1962, Secretary McNamara nnounced his 
decision to award the TFX contract to the General Oynamics/Grunvnan 
team. 
Highlights of the Competitive Periods. 
In all four of the competitive bidding periods, Boeing proposals 
significantly undercut those of General Dynamics with the promises of 
superior operational capabilities at lower quoted costs. Specifically, 
Boeing underbid the General Dynamics proposal by $91.2 million, /.1!!_ 
yet promised such innovations as thrust reversers (vice conventional 
speedbrakes), /12. use of titanium in the wing structure, greater weapons 
selectivity and carrying ability, and less risk of foreign object damage 
to engines by placing air inlet ducts high on the fuselage. Boeing's 
proposals especially appealed to the military experts because they 
suggested production of essentially two different aircraft, better 
suited to each of the services• missions. Interchangeability (commonality) 
of parts was estimated by Boeing at 60.7% while the General Dynamics 
proposal was estimated at 83.7%. The airframe structure designed by 
General Dynamics was 92% identical between the Navy and Air Force 
versions. /20 In short, the Boeing proposals suggested significantly 
better operational characteristics than ttose of General Dynamics at 
less cost, while General Dynamics proposed lesser operational cap-
abilities at higher costs. Why, then, did Secretary McNamara opt 
for the General Dynamics bid over the apparantly superior Boeing 
proposal? 
DOD Assumptions 
O As mentioned earlier, Secretary McNamara promised an active lead-
ership role in the Department of Defense when he assumed office in 
/l§_ Ibid, Exhibit 13. 
/17 Navy experts at this time generally agreed that although both 
bids were unsatisfactory, Boeing had a better "feel" for the Navy's 
requirements. 
/~ TFX Investigation l, p. 78. 
/19 Both thrust reversers and speedbrakes are used to increase 
deceleration characteristics of the aircraft. 
/20 Art, .QR• cit., p. 150. 
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January, 1961. He si.mply refused to accept the 11rubber stamp" role which 
had been characteristi.c of nis. predecessors, a role quietly enjoyed 
by the mili t ary leaders in the past. Ai.r force Chief of Staff General 
Curti:s LaMay testified that out of 23 proposals recommended to Secretary 
of the Ai.r Force durtng hi:s tenure, none had ever been overruled by 
ei.ther the Secretary of the Air Force or the Defense Department./f.}_ 
Secretary McNamara labeled numerous pitfalls in the existing 
source selection process which he consi.dered in conflict with his 
optirrum cost-effectiveness analysi:s: 
1. The military habitua l ly l eaned toward that producer 
who promised the highest operational capabilit y wi th the least cost. 
The seller was encouraged to bid low, and thus develop a strong per-
suasive selling point for the Congress and Service Secretaries. Later, 
when additional fiscal appropriations became necessary for program r1 
continuation, the military argued t hat more money would be wasted in 
curtailing or cancelling the projec t than by adding extra dollars for 
its completion. 
2. The military was prone to accept the contractor who 
offered the 11nice-to-have u extras which often involved higher tech-
nological risks. Secretary McNamara equated t hese risks with uncertainty, 
time delays, and ultimately higher costs . He attempted to weed-out 
those characteristics he defi ned as non-essential in an attempt to reduce 
overall project costs. 
3. The 1962 Source Selecti on System was far too rigid. 
The charter which established the Source Selection Board demanded that 
a source be determined at the earliest possible time to expedite develop-
ment and construction phases of the program. Secretary McNamara sought 
alternative reconmendations rather than one recommendation for a single 
source. He also noted that only 1% of the total time devoted toward 
system evaluation was used to address the problem of cost comparisons. 
"Cost proposals were never compared with each other, only against a 
present standard" established by the Evaluation Board. He concluded 
that the "Air Force simply did not have a method for estimating total 
program costs. 11/22 In l ater testimony, Secretary McNamara dmitted 
that he was forced into a position in which he had to make "rough 
judgements" similar to his experie nces at Ford Motor Company./23 
4. Speci fic comparisons of both Boeing and General Dynamics 
proposals revealed, in Secretary McNamara1 s mind, that: 
a. The Boeing design involved substantially greater risk, 
promised larger technological advances, and demanded extensive development 
efforts. 
/fl Art, QR• cit., p. 150 . 
/22 Ibid., p. 106. 





b. General Dynamtcs expressed a more thorough knowledge 
of cost realism. As an example, Boeing's cost estimates for thrust 
reversers ran 25-55% lower than those. currently bei.ng suppli:ed to 
commerctal atrli.nes as a ground brak..i_ng devi.ce./24 Concurrently, 
Boeing proposed use of thrust reversers as a means of i.ncreasing air-
craft performance characterhti.cs inflight. Such proposals fell far 
short of the afrcraft industry's "state of the art 11 in 1962. Neither 
ground nor inflight thrust reversers have been developed for military 
aircraft in the following decade. On the other hand, General Dynamics 
suggested use of the proven, conventional speedbrakes for the TFX. 
C. The General Dynamics/Gru1T111an team had fighter aircraft 
production experience which far surpassed that of Boeing. General 
Dynamics had produced the successful F-102 and F-106 for the Air 
Force. Gru1m1an held the enviable record of having produced the air-
craft in which 1/2 of the flying hours compiled by the Navy since 
World War II were flown. The last fighter aircraft produced by Boeing 
was the P-26 in 1939. Boeing had never produced a supersonic fighter. 
d. Finally, Secretary McNamara strongly countered the 
military argument that Boeing would ultimately pay the increased costs 
under a fixed-price-incentive-fee contract. He pointed out the fact 
that the contractor was not held responsible for engineering changes 
that developed during the design phase of the project and that con-
tract negotiations for the production phase would ultimately lead to 
a recouping of losses incurred during development. 
In effect, Secretary McNamara demanded an active viable role in 
the selection process and neither the military nor the aircraft in-
dustry was prepared to abide by the new game rules. He freed himself 
of the "historic dependence on the experience and knowledge of his 
military experts and career civil servants./25 11Just as Secretary 
McNamara was trying to force the services into a comnon development 
program, so too was he trying to change the basis on which they have 
traditionally made their decisions .... he was asking them to give more 
consideration to realistic cost estimates. 11/26 He countered the ar-
guments of virtually hundreds of advisors andpicked the General 
Dynamics/Grumman team. 
As development of the TFX (redesignated F-lllA for the Air Force 
and F-lllB for the Navy) began, both services continued to register 
strong resistance to the third guideline laid out by Secretary McNamara 
during the period immediately preceeding the four competitive periods. 
Secretary McNamara had stated that judging criteria for all proposals 
would include: (1) a design which would add significantly to the tac-
tical air capabilities for both Navy and Air Force, (2) a demonstration 
/24 Ibid., p. 140. 
/25 Ibid., p 161. 
/'l:E_ Ibid., p. 81. 
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of credi.bi l i.ty i.n unde.rstandi.ng costs, and ( 3) a mi.ni.mum di. vergence 
from a common des i_gn. /27 
The gap between the Ai.r force and Navy design requirements grew 
steadily even as bids were recei .ved and the TF.X program neared the 
development phase. A large, hi.gh. speed Air Force tacti.cal fighter 
simply would not mold to meet the constraints imposed by the Navy's 
aircraft carrier. The Navy first recommended cancellation of the 
F-1118 project i.n February, 1964, as i.t became obvious that General 
Dynamics could not develop a comnon Navy-Air Force fighter suitable 
for use i.n the aircraft carrier environment. Wind over the deck re-
quirements became the major concern. The average aircraft carrier was 
capable of producing approximately 30 knots of wind in a calm wind 
environment. As aircraft weight increases, the amount of wind re-
quired for both take-off and landing increases considerably. General ( 
Dynamics could not meet the carrier limitations and sati sfy the long 
range ferry requirements of the Air Force simultaneously: wind over the 
deck requirements were estimated at an acceptable 5 knots in February, 
1962, but, because General Dynamics was unable to limit weight increases, 
jumped to an unacceptable 22 knots in February, 1964./28 (see Appendix B) 
A Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) study, in effe ct the 
Secretary of Defense's own study, predicted that the proj ected final 
configuration of the F-111B would not meet the Navy's carrier per-
formance requirements primarily because of weight increases. Thi s 
study also made the prophesy: "If the pilots don't like it, it will 
never reach the fleet." That prediction came true./29 
A second request for cancellation from the Navy ~ .1s delivered to 
the Secretary of Defense in July, 1964. Denial was ar in issued in the 
form of a memorandum directing the Secretary of the Nay to further 
explore departure from the commonality concept in order to provide 
greater weight reductions. 
Running parallel to the Navy production and design problems were 
difficulties with the F-lllA program. Production test pilots reported 
significant shortcomings, particularly in ferry range specifications 
and engine performance. Considerable redesign of both aircraft appeared 
imminent in late 1965 when Secretary McNamara nnounced at a press 
conference that a new FB-111 would be produced for the Air Force Strategic 
Air Command. The FB-111 was described as the replacement for the 
aging 8-52. Flight characteristics were briefly mentioned at the press 
conference: an operational range comparable to the 8-52 at twice the l) 
speed. 
In July, 1966, special test flights were conducted by General 
Dynamics and it became evident that neither the F-lllA or F-1118 
would meet the operational range requirements laid down by the services. 
/27 TFX Investigation 1, p. 14-15. 
/28 TFX Investigation £, p. 455. 
/29 F-1118 ad hoc study by the Office of Defense Research and En-




Unofficially, Project Icarus /30 was born in August, 1966, as Sec-
retary McNamara personally assumed management of the F-111 program in 
an attempt to avert disaster. 
Program goals for the TF1 at the time of the original contract 
award1ng were 1,726 total aircraft at an average cost of $3.4 million 
per aircraft. Ntne F-1118 ai.rcraft were produced for the Navy, but all 
were used for research and development. No actual production 
F-111B 's were ever bui'lt. Average cost per Navy aircraft was es-
timated at $4.2 million. 
The Air Force accepted 413 f-111 aircraft at an estimated unit 
cost of $15.3 million. 
Appendices A and B highlight some of the major technical difficulties 
incurred in the F-111 program. 
/30 TFX Investigation 2, p. 544. An unofficial organization 
established by Secretary McNamara nd included key Assistant Secretaries 
and contractor representatives. Early Project Icarus meetings were 
scheduled weekly. 
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Summary of Lessons Learned. 
Al though. the preceding comments provi.de only a hri.ef overvi.ew 
of the major dtfficulti .es i.ncurred i.n the TFJC program, they should 
generate some insight into the prohl ems which can be anti.ci.pated 
by future military procurement managers. 
l. Costtng. Major program costing ls still only a fuzzy 
guess at best. Secretary McNamara probably recogni.zed thi.s problem 
long before he entered the Pentagon; even af t er his 6-year absence from 
public office, large cost overruns still make prominent headlines almost 
daily. Senator Proxmire stated on Monday, 31 July, 1972 /31 that he 
was personally aware of 45 military programs in which significant cost () 
overruns were necessary for completion. The Army, on 10 August, 1972,/32 
announced cancellation of its contract for the Cheyenne helicopter. -
An Army spokesman, quoted by the press, described escalating costs and 
failure to meet operational requirements as the primary reasons for 
ca nee 11 a tion. 
Extensive news coverage of one C-SA engine dropping on a runway 
sparked considerable public controversy over the high cost overruns in 
that program. Midway through C-5A production, Lockheed, the prime 
contractor, stated that it simply could not live with the contract 
price agreed to early in the program. Lockheed later requested and 
obtained $250 million in loan guarantees from the government to merely 
"stay alive" as a competing aircraft producer. 
This autho1· feels that the prime target area for the military 
manager should be the Program Definition Phase in which techniques must 
be developed to accurately describe program requirements./33 A 11per-
fectly11 defined program by the military would preclude any:Obange in 
requirement specifica t ions through both development and production .... 
impossible maybe, but well worth shooting for. Responsibility for 
successful program completion must necessarily rest with both buyer 
and seller joint ly working withi n the guidelines of a well defined 
initial plan . If t he need for constantly changing requirements can 
be diminished or removed, accurate cost analysis can only improve. 
2. Advice. Secretary McNamara had no formal analysis or-
ganization from which he could draw reliable systems data for decision U 
/31 San Francisco Chronicle, 31 July 1972, p. 1. 
/32 Monterey Peninsula Herald, 10 August, 1972, p. l and p. 4. 
/33 McNamara's ori ginal concept has been changed to "Contractor 
Definition Phase" (CDP} in which the contractor is required to submit his 
11plc1n of attack . " This is particularly important in programs which 





makl ng 'purpose.s./34 He. he.ld li.ttle. confidence in the exi.sttng mi-litary 
equi.ement se.le.cti.on process, and, s:iroilari.ly, di.splayed little trust 
in h1.s ow11.. De.fe.nse Department Research. and Engtne.eri ng Offi.ce. The f; • 
highly successful A-7 -program ~as born out of reco11J11e.ndattons· to - J ~ 
Secretary McNamara in 1961. DDR&E. proposed a "smaller, si.mpler, :no 
che.!1per11 ai :rcraft to perform the clos.e afr support role fon ' the .• ·· i·•·:r: 
mil i tai:-y services. /35 As. a result, Secretary McNamara backed down , r"' 
on hf.samultimission concept (one fi_ghter for all services '), yet he , (1 
contir_,_\Jed to pursue the TFX .as a bt-service ffghter for the- Air Force 
anf Navy: •• 
1DDR&E s.tudies in A1,1gust, 1964, predtcted the failure Jof the F-1118 
to meet t~e Navy's flight performance requirements. This 1£prediction 
strongly supported the Navy's request to have the • F-11] B· program scr.apped. 
Yet, Secretary McNamara steadfastly directed a study of the "possjbility 
that other modifications to the F-1118 system, at a cost of a decrease 
in conmonality, could result in the re-establishment of the desired 
- m~rgi.r:t.~ 11/36 , 1 , rt ,Jr: 
, Sound, reliable analysis data from an organization in which c .. _ 
Secretary McNamara had some confidence would, no doubt, have convinced 
the "boss" that his stringent conmonality constraints, coupled with the 
dema~ds for great technological advances, might dictate pursuit of the 
., TfX p,rograrp on a lesser scale. Unquestionably, failures of the TFX led 
to vthe .. organization of the Of fice of Systems Analysis (OSA) in 1962: ,, 
Each military branch has similarly followed suit by establishing Jthein 
r~spective systems analysis organizations, capable of supporting the 
tota) analysis needs of the Defense Department. If for no other reason, 
the co~siderable investment in operations research and analysis will pay 
its way if the military can only develop a conmunications link with 
the rapidly growing systems analysis discipline. 
,, The Office of Systems Analysis is obviously not the only answer 
to ~h~ problems connected with large scale military procurement, but , 
few c9uld disagree that ~it far surpasses the archaic attitude that 
innovation °and invention cannot be costed./37 At the ~very minimum, it 
represents a step toward attempting to un4erstand and recognize true 
co~ts (fiscal or otherwise) of large military procurement progr-ams. 
{ 
3. Contracts. Free competition in the market place, like motherhood 
and , 4th of July, remain as the backbone of the democr.atic process. 
In ~reality .,, many parts of our economic system become monsters as we 
attempt to uphold those principles. A one-shot, mm-repet i tive, large ,· 
mi,\itary Ql'.'ocurement program is, quite obviously, one of those sit- ~, 
uation~ ~hich will not fit the purely competitive mold . Quite simply ,,c 
contractors recognize staggering costs associated with technologi ·c-al :-9 
/34 Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? 
Shaninathe Defense Prooram 1961-1969 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 
P 26~ p \ • .c:.,.;; -
' ,, . ; ri, t ; il'•' .,,, .01 ,M .~9)''i~·1 D911T1,4 
--- ... -~ - - -··----- --/35 TFX Investigation l , p . 6. 
/36 Ibid.,p.59. 
• ;· i • '1 • J • • t O {l 
"D • '.J 
/37 Art, .Q2.• cit . , p . 89 :i 
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risk, and refuse. without inducement, to pursue the unknown with any 
degree of depth. 
Contracts designed for the TfX program and many since the TFX, 
have deci.dedly aimed at the fi,xed price i.ncenttve fee phi_ losophy. 
Attempts have been made to force both development and production under 
one negotiated agreement to prevent blatant fi.scal waste early in the 
program with hopes of "catching up" by rai:si:ng the production price. 
Widespread cost over-runs duri.ng the last 10 years have been blamed 
primar.ily on 11unjustifiable demandi.ng performance requirements set 
for the (program} by the Services. 11/38 The question remains: how 
can we, as military managers, contradict cost-overrun claims when, in 
fact, we have inaccurate means of cost determination at the outset 
of the program? The answer is not intuitively obvious. It remains 
an area which will demand the attention of the professional military 
analyst. 
4. Publicity. As an interim measure, why not consider the 
benefits of marketing the Pentagon's products? "Good marketing managers 
are by job definition, e~perts in the exploitation of all manner of 
communications media for the selling to potential customers of what-
ever it is their organization is promoting. In the Pentagon's case, 
the selling would be of plans and policies, mostly, to those experts 
in specialized fields who support defense needs to make the new policies 
most effective. 11/39 No doubt, communication runs smoothly to key 
individuals who are directly concerned with a program, but the trickle 
of information beyond that select group is imperceptible. "The result 
is (often} .... strong opposition to a Pentagon plan where, if the full 
facts were known, they would be be receiving endorsements instead 11/40 
The military manager, quite frankly, is being pushed into an 
environment in which he simply cannot justify a program with nonsense 
technical "gobbledygook". One facet of the TFX which led to the Navy's 
rej ection was the Air Force demand for a transoceanic ferry range. 
Such a demand posed a direct threat to the need for an aircraft 
carrier; but, rather than rebut the program on that basis, it appears 
that attempts were made to hide valid counter arguments under a cloak 
of aerodynamic jargon./il 
The need for selling our plans and policies is evident if only 
the vehement reactions by Congress, the press, and the public are used 
as indicators. The flow of criticism often starts at the Congressional 
level, fi l ters to the press, and is ultimately magnified by the tax-
payer complaining about the pinch on his wallet. An energetic selling 
job could certainly divert considerable criticism away from the Defense 
establishment. 
/38 Enthoven, .QQ_. cit.. p. 263. 
/39 C. W. Borklund, "The Pentagon Needs a Marketing Manager," 
Armed Forces Management, vol. IX (August, 1966}, p. 11. 
/40 Ibid., p. 11. 







I. Mtssion Requtrements Di.ffe.rences Between Navy TFX and 
Compromise TFX /42 
Navy Desires Compromi.se 
Primary Mission Atr Superi.ority DO-LO-HI 
(air-to-air} (l} (air-to-ground) 
Secondary Mission Attack (air-to-ground) Air Superiority 
(air-to-atr) 
Maximum Gross Weight 50,000 Pourids 59,000 pounds 
Aircraft Length 56 feet 66 feet 
Cost in Production $3 million $3. 5 mi 11 ion 
(1) Deployment of the aircraft/weapons against hostile aircraft 
(2) Refers to mission profile. Aircraft remains at a low profile after 
takeoff remains low until weapons delivery. A high altitude profile 
is then flown to homebase. 




Weight, empty, pounds 
Maximum Speed, Mach 
Combat Ceiling 
Loiter time, 150 mi les, 
hours 
Launch wind over the 
deck, knots 
Recovery wind over the 
deck, knots 
Takeoff weight, pounds 
Accelerat ~on time, 
seco1 ,<ls 







































2 . Specifications of the F-111B which led to cancellation of the production 
program. 
3. A longer time to accelerate from loiter speed to combat speed is a 
deficiency of the aircr aft. 
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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF SMOKING 
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I am 41 years of age and have never smoked. My wife has smoked for years. 
Very recently, my 17 year old son began smoking. Most of the people with whom 
I come in contact smoke, as is evidenced by the National Health Survey of 
1964-1965. This survey indicates that 51 percent of the men and 33 oercent 
of the women over 17 years of age are cigarette smokers,Ll In view of all 
the information which has been published by reputable authorities pointing to 
the inescapable conclusion that cigarette smoking is a serious health hazard, 
one would think that cigarette smoking would have shown a drastic decline; 
however, this is not the case. Authoritative sources place the number of 
Ll Diehl, Harold S. Tobacco and Your Health: The Smoking Contro-
versy. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. , 1969, p. 121. 
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people who quit smoking once they start at under 20%.~ In their research, 
E. C. Hammond and C. Percy found that only 6.3% of ex-smokers said that they 
quit smoking because of the lung cancer reports./4 Cigarette smoking is 
still widespread and social ly acceptable. -
A questionnaire survey of 6459 students in 16 high schools published in 
the April, 1967 issue of "Scholastic Roto," a national magazine supplement 
for high school newspapers, reported that 94 percent of the students said that 
they believe smoking is harmful. In spite of this, 44 percent of high school 
boys and 37 percent of high school girls smoked.JS 
Dr. E. Chesser, the author of When and How to Quit Smoki ng, has stated: 
"Smoking is almost entirely psychological. In the foreseeable future it 
cannot be doubted that mill i ons of people all over the world will continue to 
turn to tobacco for consolation, no matter how dire the warnings. 11/6 Most 
individuals who smoke for a period of months or years tend to acQuire a 
psychological if not a physiological need that in many cases amounts to a 
compulsion./7 () 
Whatever the factors that motivate continuance of smoking, they appear 
to be far more potent than scientifically accepted probability statistics 
showing greater health risk . With the knowledge concerning smoking that 
peoole apparently oossess, I am very much i nterested in the factors that 
motivate them to begin and continue smoking. It is these factors which I 
have researched and whi ch I discuss in this paper . 
Why People Smoke 
Wha: is the sense of burnin g ~oney and possibly injuring our health? 
Few enjoy their first cigarette. After enforced abstention during an il l ness, 
the ret~,n to smoking is eagerly anti cipated, and yet the result is almost 
always one of anti-climax. The expected pleasure does not materialize, and 
the usual reaction is disappointment. But in spite of this, the smoker 
persists. He seems to be impelled by a force he cannot control. 
When asked why they smoke, people offer a variety of explanations. 
They will say that it soothes their nerves, relieves their boredom, gives 
them something to do with their hands. Some will say that it makes them 
more sociable and others that it is an aid to concentration. There is a 
certain amount of truth in this; though, the pleasure of smoking seems to be 
largely of a negative kind. It is not so much that the act of smoking is 
pleasurable in itself as that not to smoke --- once the habit is formed ---
is intensely disagreeable. 
Dr. Daniel Horn, Director of the National Clearinghouse for Smoking 
and Health, has stated that people smoke cigarettes for one or more of the () 
/2 Haenszel, W.; et al. "Tobacco Smoking Patterns in the United 
State's;" Public Health Monogram, 1956, No. 45, p. 24. 
/3 Hammond, E. C. and Percy, C. 11Ex-smokers, 11 New York State Journa 1 
of Medicine, Sept . 1958, p. 2956. 
/4 Ibid. 
/5 Diehl, Harold S. Tobacco and Your Health: The Smoking Contro-
versy-. New York: McGraw-Hi 11 Book Co. , 1969, p. 124. 
/6 Chesser, Eustace. When and How to Quit Smoking. New York: 
Emerson Books, Inc., 1964, p. 10. 
/7 Goldenson, Robert M. The Encyclopedia of Human Behavior: Psy-
chology, Psychiatry, and Mental Health . 2. New York: Doubleday & Co., 




following reasons: (1) for stimulation. such as to get started in the morning; 
(2) because of addiction, this smoker "must have11 a cigarette after a certain 
amount of time has elapsed; (3) to reduce negative feelings, such as distress, 
anger, or fear; (4) out of habit --- a behavior pattern followed almost invol-
untarily; (5) for oral gratification --- the satisfaction derived from something 
in the mouth; and (6) for pleasurable relaxation --- to enhance positive 
feelings, such as after a good dinner./8 
The desire to conform is innate inmost people. One does not like to be 
different from the group of which he is a part. Many boys and girls start and 
continue to smoke because their associates smoke. The social acceptability and 
the prevalence of smoking are constant encouragements to smoke.l2_ 
Smoking is a device for overcoming the fear of loneliness and alienation./10 
In a sense, the cigarette gives a person "Dutch courage." Not by direct intox-- -
ication, but by making him feel that he is not thrown upon his own resources. 
It creates a feeling of kinship with others by sharing the same type of 
gratification./11 
The use of tobacco is a crutch for most smokers. People reach for a 
smoke at moments of stress, boredom, frustration and indecision, and the 
people who reach for a smoke most often are those who are most often at these 
emotional extremes./12 
The tobacco leaf contains a number of noxious substances, the chief of 
which is nicotine, a nerve poison. The action of nicotine is first to 
stimulate the nervous system, then to depress it. Investigation shows that 
when you light a cigarette, your heart beats faster. Nicotine acts as a 
sedative./13 Whether it should be regarded in the strict sense as a 
sedative ~an academic question. Its effect is sedation. In periods of 
nervous stress, smoking increases./14 
People smoke tobacco for much the same reasons as opium and hashish 
are smoked. Tobacco is an escape drug. It softens the harsh contours of 
reality. It does so partly by its chemical action on the central and 
peripheral nervous systems and partly by providing a psychological release 
from tension. /15 
Nothing could be more evidential of the mental factor in smoking than 
the recent study of a group of people who smoked the same brand of cigarettes 
for completely opposite reasons -- some to get a lift and some to be calmed 
down. This clearly makes smoking a subjective experience, in that people 
derive from it the emotional pattern they seek. Those who have most to seek 
smoke the most./16 
/8 Horn, Daniel; et al. "Cigarette Smoking Among High School Students," 
American Journal of Public Health, November, 1959. 
/9 Diehl, Harold S. Tobacco and Your Health: The Smoking Contro-
versy-. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1969, p. 194. 
/10 Chesser, Eustace. When and How to Quit Smoking. New York: 
Emerson Books, Inc., 1964, p. 38. 
/11 Ibid., p. 39. 
/12 Ochsner, Alton. Smoking: Your Choice Between Life and Death. 
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970, p. 138. 
/13 Chesser, Eustace. When and How to Quit Smoking. New York: 
Emerson Books, Inc., 1964, p. 31. 
/14 Ibid., p. 14. 
/15 Ibid., p. 31. 
/16 Ochsner, Alton. Smoking: Your Choice Between Life and Death. 
New York: Simon and Schust·oeFr-, 11r"C9r7Jrro-, •p,.--r-13~5:;--_-----------.:.......:..::.=.:.:.:. 
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Smoking By The Young 
If there were not strong psychological reasons for smoking, the 
unpleasant taste of the first cigarette would cause it to be thrown away. 
The schoolboy is usually initiated by his companions who are in fact 
rebelling against their status as juveniles, for whom smoking is prohibited. 
To defy the ban is one way of experiencing the grown-up pleasures which are 
forbidden to them. The cigarette is a symbol of the mysterious adult worl d 
from which juveniles are excluded. While they are smoking, they feel that 
they are behaving like grown-ups instead of children, and the very secrecy 
establishes a bond with their smoking companions. They discover the value 
of tobacco as a social asset, which is undoubtedly one reason for its popu-
larity. Presumably any peer-oriented youngster is likely to smoke, whatever 
his social status, as part of a kind of defiant claim on adul t status.fil 
They do not realize tobacco's insidious power as a sedative until they have 
accustomed themselves to tolerate the physical effects of nicoti ne. This O 
usually does not take long. Once tobacco exerts its tranquillizing influence 
the habit is well on the way to becoming fixed./18 
Dr. Daniel Horn, in discussing the behavioral aspects of cigarette 
smoking in teenagers, stated: "Smoking is high among those who have fallen 
behind their age equals in school, do not participate in extracurricular 
activities and are taking the scholastically less demanding courses in 
school work.11/19 
The decision to smoke is especially influenced by the smoki ng habi ts 
of parents. Boys tend to imitate their father and girls their mother. The 
children of parents who smoke are far more likely to do so than the children 
of non-smokers. By smoking or abstaining, children identify wit h the adults 
they admire, especially their parents./20 
Based on a study of 21,980 teenagers, the following results were pub-
lished by Dr. Daniel Horn, et al, in an article entitled "Cigarette Smoking 
Among High School Students 1'1 : 
1. The percentage of smokers was highest among children of families in 
which both parents smoked cigarettes, lowest in families in which neither parent 
smoked and intermediate in families in which only one parent smoked. 
2. The smoking behavior of boys tedned to conform more closely to that 
of the father, while the smoking pattern of girls fol lowed more close1y that 
of the mother. 
3. The percentage of smokers among children from families in which one 
or both parents continued to smoke was significantly higher than the percentage 
in children from homes in which one or both parents had given up smoking. 
4. Each successive schoo1 grade had a higher percentage of smokers. <J 
/17 McArthur, C.; et al. "The Psycho1ogy of Smoking," Journal of 
Abnormaf and Socia1 Psychology, 1958, 56, p. 269. 
/18 Chesser, Eustace. When and How to Quit Smoking. New York: 
Emerson Books, Inc ., 1964, p. 34. 
/19 Horn, Daniel; et al. "Cigarette Smoking Among High School 
Students," American Journal of Public Health, November, 1959. 
/20 Chesser, Eustace . When and How to Quit Smoking. New York: 




5. The percentage of smokers was higher among students in Catholic 
schools than among students in the city public schools. It was lowest among 
students in the suburban schools. 
6. The percentage of smokers among boys who did not participate in athletics 
was substantially higher than the percentage among those who did and had a 
coach. The percentage of smokers was higher among students who did not 
participate in any school activities.fil 
Socia 1 Factors 
The fact that a man smokes or does not seems to be determined by whether 
or not he has been oriented to the habit as a result of his social milieu. 
Nonsmokers tend to be lower-middle class in origin, upwardly mobile, 
earnest young men, bred in a work morality that is conducive to inner direction. 
Their parents and they themselves are often pious. They may pursue scientific 
or technical careers in many instances. Smokers are likely to come from more 
privileged backgrounds, often entering business or humanistic careers. Both 
subculture and the family as the mediator of the subculture are important 
determinants of whether and when the young man is oriented to the smoking 
habit./22 
Psychoanalytical Explanation 
In Freudian terms, the satisfaction gained from smoking is a residue of 
the oral phase of psychosexual development, the infantile period in which 
the mouth is the chief pleasure zone of the body. Moreover, smoking may 
provide a measure of emotional security as well as physical , erotic pleasure, 
since it harks back to an earlier stage when the smoker was given constant 
care and attention. According to this theory, then, a cigarette serves as 
an oral 11oacifier 11 providing temporary relief from the tensions and stresses 
of life./23 
Smoking can also be called a conditioned reflex. On this basis, a child 
is conditioned to feel more secure when the nipple, or some substitute, is 
placed in his mouth. When he grows up, the craving persists and is satisfied 
by a pipe, a cigar or a cigarette. 
A cluster of unconscious associations, dating from infancy, is reactivated 
by smoking. That is why when people smoke they feel less lonely, and why in a 
group of smokers they no longer feel estranged. The painful sense of separation 
which heightens all their anxieties is ended./24 
fil Horn, Daniel; et al. 11Cigarette Smoking Among High School 
Students," American Journal of Public Health, November, 1959. 
/22 McArthur, C.; et al. "The Psychology of Smoking,11 Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1958, 56, p. 274. 
/23 Goldenson, Robert M. The Encyclopedia of Human Behavior: Psy-
.... c_ho_l_o_..g~y~,=P,.....cs .... Y_c_h1~· a-t=r""'"y..._,-'a;.._n_d ____ Me n_t_a_l_H_e_a_l_t""-h. 2. New York: Doubleday & Co., 
Inc., 1970, p. 1215. 
/24 Chesser, Eustace. When and How to Quit Smoking. New York: 
Emerson Books, Inc., 1964, p. 44. 
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Psychological Correlates 
There are distinct relationships between habits and personality groups. 
The Surgeon General's conmittee has said: "There appear enough differences 
between smokers and nonsmokers to warrant the assertion that there are indeed 
different psychological dynamics at work." 
Fifty nonsmoking and twenty-two smoking female undergraduates were 
compared on thirty-six variables. Smokers were found: (a) to have more 
problems and be more anxious; (b) to be as intelligent as nonsmokers; (c) 
to be less interested in science and music; (d) to be franker in resoonding 
to paper and pencil personality tests; (e) to dislike more foods than non-
smokers; (f) to come from the same size families as do nonsmokers; and (g) 
to be more dominant than nonsmokers. Amount of smoking was positively re-
lated to anxiety and negatively related to musical and literary interests./25 
In their writing, Matarazzo and Saslow have reported the following -
characteristics: IQ is probably not related to smoking. Smokers show more 
anxiety than nonsmokers. Smokers show more signs of psychological tension 0 
than nonsmokers. Smokers indi cate a greater number of psychosomatic symptoms 
than do nonsmokers. Smokers consume more coffee and alcohol than non-
smokers./26, 27 
A very significant relations hi p exists bet ween extroversion and smoking. 
Smokers are more extroverted than nonsmokers./28 The general pi cture whi ch 
emerges from H.J. Eysenck's study is one of smokers tending to live faste r 
and more intensely, and to be more socially outgoing. 
Numerous studies have indicated a l ink between heavy smoking and 
neuroticism. Such traits as anxiety, nervousness, somatic symptoms and 
restlessness in terms of job and residence are associated wi t h the smoking 
habit. Studies also show that ~mokers are more l i kely to experi ence psycho-
somatic manifestations than nonsmokers./29 
Excessive Smoking 
Whether a smoker becomes a heavy smoker seems to depend on whether the 
habit serves many of his important needs. Very anxious or agitated men may 
adopt smoking as a tension reducer, but this use of smoking seems to be common 
only when the habit is already well established by other circumstances . 
Emotionally-constricted individuals seem to 11take to" smoking with special 
eagerness./30 
/25 Walker, R. E.; et al. 11Psychological Correlates of Smoking," 0 
Journar-of Clinical Psychology, 1969, 25(1), pp. 42-44. 
/26 McArthur, C.; et a 1. 11The Psychology of Smoking, 11 Journa 1 of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1958, 56, p. 269. 
/27 Heath, C. W. 11Differences Between Smokers and Non-smokers,11 
American Medical Association Archives of Internal Medicine, 1958, 101, p. 385. 
/28 Eysenck, H. J.; et al. "Smoking and Personality, " British Medical 
Journai"";"March 14, 1960. 
/29 Ochsner, Alton. Smoking: Your Choice Between Life and Death. 
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970, p. 139. 
/30 McArthur, C.; et al. 11The Psychology of Smoking,'' Journal of 
Abnoriiiaf and Social Psychology, 1958, 56, p. 274. 
48 
0 
On the basis of five cases of compulsive smokers who underwent psycho-
analysis, it has been suggested that in all cases a similar neurotic 
subs true tu re was found: 11These patients represented a specific type of masochist 
who unconsciously wanted constantly to be refused. To counteract the inner 
reproach stelll11ing from their inner conscience, which objected to the wish to 
be refused, they 'proved' that they wanted the opposite -- to get. The outward 
sign was getting a cigarette, an oral 'pacifier' reminding the individual of 
his first reassurance in life."/31 
Psychological Danger of Smoking 
The heavy smoker who appears to be in normal health is none the less 
mentally sick. His preference for cigarettes rather than pipe tobacco betrays 
a different type of personality. There is an undercurrent of anxiety, a pervading 
sense of inadequacy, which quick, nervous smoking deadens. As with all addictions, 
nicotine is demanded in ever-increasing quantities. Smoking does not diminish 
the cause of anxiety; it merely drives it below the surface of consciousness . 
As long as the anxiety is not intolerable, smoking will give some apparent 
relief./32 
Smoking and Academic Performance 
A negative relationship between cigarette smoking and academic performance 
has been noted by a number of investigators. A study by D. K. Pumroy demon-
strated a linear relationship between amount of cigarette smoking and (1) 
grade-point average and (2) probability of dropping out of college for a 
sample of male freshmen. He attributed this relationship to negative atti-
tudes toward parents and authority on the part of the smokers, although no 
attitude data were provided./33 
An earlier study by D. rsaer included the finding that cigarette smokers 
(former and current) obtained significantly lower scores on the mathematical 
portion of the "Scholastic Aptitude Test" (SAT}./34 
In 1968, D. J. Veldman and 0. H. Bown conducted an investigation at the 
University of Texas. The investigation was conducted to provide more definitive 
analyses of the relationship between cigarette smoking and academic achievement, 
as a function of abilities and attitudes toward parents and other authority 
figures. Using data from 2315 freshmen (1358 males and 957 females), the 
previously reported negative relationships between cigarette smoking and (a) 
verbal ability, (b) quantitative ability, and (c) grade averages of college 
freshmen were confirmed. It was found that the results applied equally to 
o males and females. Previously hypothesized negative relationships between 
/31 Bergler, E. "Psychopathology of Compulsive Smoking,11 Psychiatric 
Quarterly, 1946, 20, p. 320. 
/32 Chesser, Eustace. When and How to Quit Smoking. New York: 
Emerson Books, Inc., 1964, p. 63. 
/33 Pumroy, D. K. "Cigarette Smoking and Academic Achievement," 
Journai--of General Psychology, 1967, 77(1), pp. 31-34. 
/34 Baer, D. J. "Scholastic Aptitude and Smoking Attitude and 
Behavior of College Males," Journal of Psychology, 1966, 64, pp. 63-68. 
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smoking and attitudes toward parental and non-parental authority figures were 
found for both sexes, although somewhat more clearly among males. The 
hypothesis that attitudes toward parental and/or non-parental authority 
figures account for the negative relationship between smoking and grades 
in college received no measurable support from the data. Analyses of data 
clearly demonstrated that neither scholastic aptitude nor attitudes toward 
authority -- although themselves related to academi c performance -- could 
account for the relationship between cigarette smoking and grade-point 
average./35 
Conclusion 
In researching the material for this paper, I have become convi nced 
that smoking is almost entirely based on psychological factors . In my 
opinion if the objective of reducing or eliminating the serious health hazard 
of smoking is ever to be achieved, it will be through making people more 
aware of the various psychological aspects of smoking rather than through 
the health-scare approach which has been utilized in the past. 
/35 Veldman, D. J. and Bown, 0. H. 11Relationships of Cigarette 
Smoking to Academic Achievement, Cognitive Abilities, and Attitudes 
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Freedom, yet not freedom! The inner drives of the adolescent stimulated by 
exterior influence guides a child t hrough adolescence to adulthood. The method 
by which these influences direct the behavior and personality toward parental lib- 0 
eration or emancipation, are deeply rooted within each culture and society . 
11 
••• in our society, a large degree of emancipation is achieved 
relatively early compared to t he delayed acquisition of adult social 
status. Through emancipation the adolescent establishes himself as 
a person in his own right, apart from his parents, prepared to strive 
for adult goals and willing to assume responsibility for the direction 
of his own affairs. But it is one matter to achieve this preparatory 
state of resolution and independence in a family setting and still 
another to achi eve that degree of social recognition as an adult which 




that is required for the attainment of this new personality status. 
Also, since it is quite impossible even (in a family setting} to 
conceive of oneself as an independent adult ready for mature tasks 
and responsibilities in the face of prolonged socioeconomic dependence, 
adolescents can only achieve a certain limited measure of emancipation 
until their economic independence is an accomplished fact."/l 
Emancipation is an important aspect, both of personality maturation and of 
the achievement of adult personality status. A great deal of personality matura-
tion is achieved in the home in relation to parents. The final transition between 
emancipation and the achievement of adult status is a function of cultural arrange-
ments that begin with formal schooling and hopefully manifests in the adult person-
a 1 i ty. 
THE FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE 
THE NATURE AND ATTAINMENT OF EMANCIPATION 
AGE TRENDS 
As an infant, a child is dependent; and, subsequently, the period of develop-
ment does not directly influence emancipation. The reasons lie partly in the fact 
that the child is relatively incompetent in the motor, intellectual and social 
skills that are necessary for survival and partly in the cultural tendency to deny 
equal social membership to sexually immature individuals--regardless of how well 
they adapt to their environment. 
As the infant grows, the child finds his parents assuming the volitional 
ascendent role--training the child in the parents cultural traditions. The child 
then adopts the role of satellite to his parents, where his sense of security and 
adequacy become increasingly dependent upon conformity to parental standards and 
expectations of more mature and appropriate behavior./_g_ 
Although independence is shown periodically through a child's home/parental 
experience, we find the course of emancipation marked by two periods of slow and 
gradual growth--each of which is followed by a period of accele~ation. 
First Period 
The first period begins with the child's entrance into school .... At this time, 
the child begins emancipation as he makes strides in personal competence through 
expansion of motor, intellectual, and social capacities and begins to perceive him-
self in a less dependent light. School forces a dramatic self-activation as a 
method of growth and of learning. It is a natural mechanism whereby the child 
organizes his feelings and thinking. But the task is too great for him alone. 
The school is the cultural instrument which must help him to enlarge and to refine 
his dramatic self-projection.l,l The function of the school is to provide personal 
and cultural experience which will simultaneously organize the growing emotions 
and the associated intellectual images. The school also provides the initial ab-
sorption into a peer group. This first spurt is climaxed by a spurt induced by 
pubescence. 
/1 Ausubel, D. P., TheorT and Problems of Adolescent Development, New York, 
Grune and Stratton, 1954, p. 2 7. 
/_g_ Ibid., p. 219. 
ll Gesell, A. , The Child From Five to Ten, New York, Harper, 1946, p. 94. 
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Second Period 
In the second period, the rate of growth after pubescence is slow again until 
adult status is rece i ved as a result of financial independence, marriage, or induc-
tion into military life. From a psychological standpoint, the criteria for ter-
mination of adolescence or the achievement of adult status, is not so much acer-
tain chronological age as it is the degree to which those adjustments are made. A 
person who marries after graduation from high school and becomes successfully em-
ployed and financi ally self-sufficient, is more likely to have attained maturity 
than a peer who attends college and is supported by his parents./4 
FACILITATING EMANCIPATION INFLUENCES 
Many forces, both psychological and physiological , combine to fac i litate eman-
ci pation of the adolescent. Independence through parental acceptance, peer groups 
influence, pubescence, and social factors combine to accent t rends of emancipation. ) 
Independence Through Parental Acceptance 
As Kulhen points out, adolescence is the period of sexual, soci al, ideological, 
and vocational adjustments and of striving for independence from parents./_§. Spang-
ler calls t his need for the adolescent to be on his own, a desire to get away from 
hi s home and family "Wonderlust.11 lfonderlust may be considered as a part of the 
adolescent need for independence./6 
As adolescents move toward greater emancipation from home, they see~ freedom 
in one area after ann+her . Even though most love the ir parents and are proud of 
their famil ies, disputes are bound to occur. ~Jherever parents try to enforce re-
strictions at these points, the youngsters are most likely to want greater liberty. 
Many of the restrictio ns imposed by parents are resented and are interpreted as 
forms of punishments rather than as rules of conduct, to which everyone must con-
form, both for his own good and for the welfare of others . /7 Thus, restrictions 
may result in direct rebellion. Wattenburg calls this, "Guerrilla Warfare within 
the home.11/8 The most frequent sources of discontent involve use of the family 
car, getting-home hours from dates, choice of friends, time given to work, voca-
tional plans and the amount of spending money. Parents want their offspring to 
defer to wisdom derived from experience. The adolescent wants his parents to have 
confidence i n him and to acknowledge that he (or she) can take care of himself 
(or herself) . /i 
/! Erickson, E. H. Childhood and Society, New York, Merten, 1950. 
/§. Kuhlen, R. G. The Psychology of Adolescent DevelQR_me!l.!, New York, 
Harper, 1952. 
/6 Spranger, E. Psychologie des Jugendaltus, 24th ed. Heidelberg, Quelle 
and Meyer, 1955, Referenced through Muss, Theories of Adolescence, New York, 
Random House 1962, p. 57. 
/7 Merry, R. V. and Merry, F. K. The First Two Decades of Life, New York, 
Harper-and Row, 1958, p. 469. 
/8 Wattenburg, w. W. The Adolescent Years, Harcourt, Brace and World, 
1955, p. 93. 
!'1. Ibi d. , p. 94. 
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11The more the adolescent feels that his maturity is underrated, 
the more rebellious he will be, and the more awkward will be his attempts 
to prove how grownup he is .... He needs further opportunities to be 
independent when his experience has let him down ... not ridicule or res-
traint. The adolescent can become independent only by trying to."/1.Q 
During preadolescence there was often a widening gap in understanding between 
children and parents. During adolescence some further drift continues; although, 
this situation may become stable. This drift is often symbolized by the adole-
scents expectations of privacy. Parents may gradually have to become used to the 
fact that their sons and daughters will no longer share their thoughts and exper-
iences. However, once parents accept this new status in relation to confidences 
and the adolescents feel that their privacies need no defense, there is sometimes 
a renewal of consultations. This situation varies from class to class and depends 
a great deal on previous relationships within the family. Boys are likely to lose 
contact with their parents earlier and girls are likely to remain closer to their 
J mothers./11 
Peer Group Influence 
Peer group influence manifests itself during enrollment in formal schooling 
and continues into adult life. A recent study by William Looft, summarizes that 
parents were perceived to be most significant for children, and peers were most 
significant to adolescents. The late adolescent/young adult samples attributed 
importance to parents less frequently than did any other age group./1.f. Havighurst, 
Robinson and Dorr found a definite shift away from parents as emulating models from 
middle childhood to early adolescence./13 
Throughout childhood, due largely to traditions relating to play, adolescents 
gradually increase the amount of peer group involvement and decrease the time spent 
with the family. A five-year-old, for example, may play out of doors only during 
the day-light hours and even then within sight of his home. By contrast, a thirteen-
year-old may come home only for meals. The sheer arithmetic (time at home vs. time 
away} of the gradual shift gives greater and greater weight to the peer-group seg-
ment of the adolescent's life./14 
While Erickson theorizes that youths rarely identify with their parents; on the 
contrary, youths rebel against dominance of parents, their value system, and their 
intrusion into his private life, since he has to separate his identity from that 
of his parents. However, there 1 s a desperate need for social belonging. The peer 
group helps the individual in finding his own identity in a social context./1§. 
With social horizons expanding, the adolescent realizes the parents' home 
embodies only that specific representation of the culture; that other ijnd perhaps 
) better patterns of values are possible. The place in which the adolescent has his 
greatest opportunity of finding social acceptance or rejection where it is essen-
tially important to him, is in the peer group. Acceptance is easier for the con-
forming adolescent and more difficult for the non-conforming. Adolescents tend to 
be clannish, to have fairly definite value judgements, and to sharply reject those 
/10 Gallagher, J.R.,M.D. Understanding Your Son's Adolescence, Boston, Little 
Brown , 19 51 , p. 16 l. 
/]l. Wattenburg, W.W., Op. Cit., p. 65. 
/,lg_ Looft, W. A. Perceptions Across the Life Span of Imlortant Informational 
Sources for Children and Adolescents, Journal of Psychology,971, 78, 201-211. 
/13 Havighurst, Robinson, Dorr, The Development of the Ideal Self in Childhood 
and AdoTescence, Journal of education Res. 40: 241-257, 1946. 
/!i Wattenburg, W.W .• Op. Cit., p. 66. 
/12_ Erickson, E. H. , Op. Cit., p. 34. 
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persons who deviate from thei r patterns of behavior, dress, and systems of values. 
/Ji Living in a kind of marginal world, where their contribution is not asked, 
they form a society of their own. To belong is of serious importance. Those who 
do not succeed in belonging now may fi nd it harder, as time goes on, to make con-
tacts and fit in socially./17 They also learn how to deal with adolescents who 
affront their group standards (i.e. tattles, bullies, etc . ). Whether or not it is 
recognized officially by grown-ups, a species of tribal self-government is prac-
ticed. This represents a long step forward in social development, even though 
its first signs tend to look like "devil-inspired waywardness. 11/]J! 
11That the adolescent takes up with his peers, his personal problems--
whether of superf i cialities of appearance and conduct or some of deeper 
importance to him--suggests t hat among his friends he feels a responsibi l ity 
for his own adjustment, of atte mpting to meet demands and expectations of 
others, of changing if necessary . w/]! 
Pubescence 
Physical maturation is an extremely important determinant of the rate of eman-
cipation. Hei ght, weight, and strength are all positively correlated with boys' 
degree of emancipation from parents as measured by Dimocks scale./20 The reasons 
are self evident. Parents and teachers scale thei r expectations of mature behavior 
in tenns of physical development rather than in terms of chronological age. This 
fact was strikingly illustrated in a study by Baker, Wright, and Gonick, in which 
expectations of parents and teachers for children of similar chronological age, 
but Jifferent physical status v.- re compound./21 
Maturity takes on new meaning when the adolescent enter s pubescence. Pube-
scence also plays the role of crucial cata lytic agent in shi,ting the direction of 
the source of status (parent/children) and, hence, in inaugurating the reversing 
social expectations about the major type of status that the child may appropriately 
seek. Hence in relation to the pubescent individual 
11 
•• • the social value of derived status depreciates while the corre-
sponding value of extrinsic status increases . The adolescent, thus, not 
only finds that he is increasingly expected to est ablish his status through 
his own efforts, but also that the latter criterion tends to displace 
the childhood criterion {i.e., of derived status) as the chief measure 
(' 
by which his social milieu tends to evaluate him. Simultaneously, social 
pressure is put on the parents to wi thdraw a large portion of the emotional 
support which they had hitherto been extending to him by way of conferring 
intrinsic status. 11 /22 U 
/li Carmichael, L. Manual of Child Psychology, New York, John Wiley, 1965. 
/17 --=----· The Adolescent in Your Family, Childrens Bureau Publication 
347, 195"5, p. 57. 
/1.§_ Wattenburg, W. W., Op. Cit., p. 63. 
/19 Zachey, C. B. Emotion and Conduct in Adolescence, N. Y.: Appleton-Century, 
1940, p"-:-355. 
/20 Dimock, H. S. Rediscovering t he Adolescent, N.Y., Assoc. Press, 1937. 
/21 Baker, R. G. , Wright, B. A. , and Gonich, M.R., Adjustment to Physical Handi-
cap anctlllness, Bull. #55. Soc. Science Research Council, 1956. 
/22 Ausubel, D. P. Ego Development and the Personality Disorders, N.Y.: Grune 




In addition to the fact that his own volition and under cultural pressure the 
parent acts to provide less derived status, his power to do so is also impared. 
Continued widening of the child's social horizon tends to effect an increasing 
devaluation of the parents' stature. In face of the altered cultural expectations 
that puberty induces, he feels that his aspirations for greater status and inde-
pendence are more legitimate. 
Although maturational change in the home antecedes pubescence, emancipation 
remains incomplete without it. The final transition between emancipation and the 
achievement of adult status, is a function of cultural arrangements that are ini-
tiated by pubescence. But, these arrangements depend on other socioeconomic fac-
tors for their consumation. 
SOCIAL FACTORS 
Important social factors affecting the rate of emancipation include the 
availability of extrinsic status for adolescents (i.e., through peer groups) and 
the degree of status roles available to children and adults respectively. The 
more secure a boy is in his relationship with his father, and the more he can 
admire his father, the readier he is to accept the responsibilities of manhood. 
In the absence of a father, or an understanding father, adolescents have a great 
need for looking up to other men./23 This adult role which plays a vital part in 
emancipation differs greatly from culture to culture and is also directly influ-
enced by socio-economic factors such as war and depression . 
Geographical location within a culture will also greatly effect the emancipa-
tion process. Rural adolescents need their parents help in making it possible for 
them to associate with peers. On fanns, adolescents who spend much of their time 
perfonning 11chores11 miss the chance for easy socialization that the city children 
take for granted. Therefore, they tend to lag in attaining emancipation. 
11It is of course impossible to describe the American scene. There is 
not one Ameri'can scene, but many scenes ... Rural life differs from urban 
life; ... boys live in an environment which differs in important (but often 
subtle} ways from the environment that impinges upon girls. 11/24 
Adult attitudes tend to be projected downward to all but the earliest child-
hood. Parents will inevitably say, "Act your age," or 11You1 re 5, you shouldn't be 
acting like that." In effect, we are enforcing an adult role upon our children, 
thereby hastening the emancipation process. Conversely, as the expectations for 
prolonged formal education increases, the adolescent becomes directly affected. 
The earlier imitation of 11adult like 11 behavior coupled with these extended periods 
of education have increased the duration of social adolescence and created a "mass 
adolescent culture pattern. 11/25 
IN CONCLUSION 
Emancipation for the adolescent is by no means a smooth transition. Many 
variables influence this desire for liberation, both from within the family and 
society. Peer groups, geographical location, parental influence, pubescence, and 
_____ .The Adolescent In Your Family, p. 57. 
/24 Kuhl en, R. G., op. cit., p. 149. 
/25 Axt, R. G. Values and Ideals of American Youths, New York: Columbia 
UniversTty Press, 1961, p. 85. 
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ethnic background, all lend direction to both the amount of emancipation and the 
time factor~ involved. 
If there is one key factor in directing the youth towards adulthood, it's 
the parent. The parent must be capable of understanding the needs of his children 
and recognize the various stages through which the adolescent must transgress. As 
a parent, direction and understanding prooerly applied wil l add to both family unity 
and adolescent maturation. 
"The 1 dea 1 home, therefore, is one which a 1 I ows for gradua 1 eman-
cipation, one 1n which the emotional ties between children and family 
are never so strong that the desire for independence leads to internal 
conflict, inadequacy. or rebellion. As the child grows to maturity 
every opportunity should be provided for independence of judgment, 
emotion, and decision."/26 
"As parents our need is to be needed. As teenagers, thei r need 
is not to need us. The conflict is real; we experience it daily. 
This can be our finest hour. To let go when we want to hold on, 
requires utmost generosity and love. 11/27 
Carl Sandburg has appropriately summed up the emancipational drives in youth. 
"One thing I know deep out of time: youth when lighted and alive and 
given a sporting chance is strong for struggle and not afraid of any 
toils or punishments or dangers or deaths. 
"What shall be the course of society and civilization across the next 
hundred years? 
"For the answer read if you can the strange and baff1 i ng eyes of youth. 
11Yes, for the answer, read if you can the strange and baff1 i ng eyes of 
youth. "/28 
/26 Schneidies, A. A., The Psychology of Adolescence, Milwaukee: Bruce, 
1951, p. 409. 
/27 Ginott, Haim G. , Between Parent and Teenager, New York, MacMillan, 
1969. -
/28 Sandburg, Carl, Always t he Young Stranger , New York: Harcourt, 
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"Girls are very stuckup and dignef ied in their manner and be 
have your. They think more of dress than anything and l ike to play 
with dowls and rags . They cry if t hey see a cow in a far distance 
and are afraid of guns. They stay at home all the time and go to 
church on Sunday. They are al-ways sick. The.Y are al-ways funy 
and maRing fun of boyt s hands and they say how di rty . They make fun 
of boys and t hen turn around and love them. I dont beleave they 
eyer kil led a cat or anything. They look out every nite and say oh 
ant the moon lovely. Thi r is one thing I have not told and that is 
they al-ways now their lessons bettern boys. 11 
- Mark Twain, English as 
She is Taught 
Were Mr. Twain to write these humorous words today he would probably end up 
in court or at the very least be accused of encouraging discriminatio n against 
the female sex. In the past few years, women1 s liberation groups have become in-
creasingly vocal, and at times, irrational, in their complaints of discrimination 
and demands for equal rights. I hope to cover in this paper some of the more ra-
tional compl ai.nts concerning di-scrimi nation experienced by that sizeable portion 
of the female population which is in the working environment. I plan to point 







current situation and to offer some thoughts on future prospects and problems. 
In March 1969, the U. S. population of women sixteen years of age and over 
numbered 71,919 thousand. Of this number, 29,898 thousand (41.6 per cent) were 
in the labor force. The median age of the employed ladies was 40. Of the full 
time employees,61.5 per cent were working in white collar jobs, 20 per cent in 
blue collar jobs, and 18.5 per cent in service or farm jobs./1 
Despite the fact that there are more than 250 distinct occupations listed 
by the Bureau of the Census, 21 of these occupations accounted for half of all 
women workers. Of these 21 occupations, only five (secretary-stenographer, house-
hold worker, bookkeeper, elementary school teacher, and waitress) supplied work 
for aoout a fourth of all employed women./2 There are many factors which have 
been offered as reasons for this high concentration of women in such a small num-
ber of occupatfons. Among these is the fact that most of these jobs are in part 
extensions of the work women have done in the home (e.g., food preparation, sew-
ing, instruction of children}. Another factor is the requirement for advanced 
degrees or long periods of training in some fields. Work that requires a profes-
sional degree or an M.A. or Ph.D., for example, is open to fewer women that men, 
since the proportion of women workers having 5 years of college or more (3 per 
cent i'n 1969} is little more than half the rate for men.11/3 Many jobs require 
extensive manual la6or and lifting of heavy objects and have traditionally been 
considered as being man's work only. General attitudes that certain work is 
proper for one sex only have contributed widely to discrimination in employment. 
Job promotion is a form of discrimination frequently encountered by women. 
Women are often considered to be incapable of occupying top leadership or manage-
ment positfons. A good example of this is the library profession. This profes-
sion was 90 per cent female in 1940 and is still dominated by women today./! 
Yet data gathered by researchers corroborates the fact of sexual discrimination 
agai'nst women i'n top administrative library positions./[ Less than two-thirds 
of 970 colleges have women on their governing boards, and of those having them, 
less than 12 per cent are women. The number of female school superintendents is 
so low tnat tfie National Educational Association does not even keep a record of 
it. "In urban schools, the numl5er of woman elementary principals declined from ... 
56 pe·r cent in 1950-1951 to 37 per cent in 1961-1962}1 /6 About the most common 
excuse for not promoting women is the idea that they would not remain with the 
company long enough to make training worthwhile. This is rather interesting when 
compared wtth Jennings' theories of mobile management. Still another factor is 
the willingness of some of the women to take on greater responsibility. 11\-Jhen it 
.comes to posts at the top, women are likely to go on finding their chances limited 
/1 Elizabeth Waldman, "Changes in the Labor Force Activity of Women," Monthly 
Labor Review, 93:6, (June, 1970}, p. 13. 
/2 Janice Neipert Hedges, 11Women Workers and Manpower Demands in the 19701s, 11 
Monthly La6or Review, 93:6, (June, 1970), p. 19. 
/1 Ibid. 
/4 Janet Freedman, "The Liberated Librarian?" Library Journal, 95:9, 
(May 1~ 1970), p. 1709. 
/5 R. L. Simpson and I. H. Simpson, Women and Bureaucracy in the Semi-
Professions (Detroit: Free Press, 1969), pp. 22-23. 
/6 Patricia Cayo Sexton, The Feminized Male (New York: Random House, 1971), 
p. 142:-
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by the reluctance of many of them to accept the overtime and generally unlimited 
conmitments which many of these posts involve."/7 
A major area of discrimination is that of equality of wages. 
tlThe Lord spoke to Moses saying: Speak to the Israelite people 
and say to them: When a man explic i tly vows to the Lord, the equiva-
lent for a human being, the fol l owing scale shall apply: If it is a 
mal e from 20 to 60 years of age, the equivalent is f i fty shekels of 
silver by the sanctuary weight; if it is a female the equivalent is 
thirty shekels. 11 
-Leviticus 27!1 - 4 
Things haven't improved very much since bibl ical times apparently. Despite the 
Equal Pay Act of 1963 which requi~es equal pay for equal work, women are still 
far behind men when it comes t ,o remuneration. In recent Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics Study of 10 selected occupations, the simple average wage differential by 
sex favored men by 18 per cent. Interesting ly enough. this advantage dropped to 
11 per cent in companies which employed both sexes in an occupation and climbed 
to 22 per cent in companies with only one sex in an occupation./8 
"Let me give some figures from the .. . Department of Labor Fact 
Sheet on the Earnings Gap and f rom the April 1970 Report on the 
President's Task Force on Women's Rights and Responsibilities. The 
median wage or salary income for a woman who worked full time in 
1968 was only 58.2 per cent of the male1 s. The gap has widened 5.7 
per cent since 1955. There is far more economic discrimination by 
sex than by race. The median earnings of white men employed full time 
is $7,366, of Negro men, $4,777,, of white women $4,279, of Negro 
women $3,194. Women with some college education - both white and 
Negro - earn less than Negro men wi th eight years of education .... 
An ... example of unequal pay for equal work ... chief financial officer 
was a woman paid $9,000 a year. When she left, they had to pay a 
man $20,000 a year to do her job. When he left they hired another 
woman at $9,000. When she left they hired a man at $18,000.11/2 
The followi ng table shows the median wage or salary income of year-round full 
time workers by major occupation group and sex in 1966 for several selected 
occupations./1.Q. 
Major Occupation Group lfomen Men 
Professional, Technical Workers $5,826 $8,945 
Managers, Officials, Proprietors 4,919 9. 103 
(except farm} 
Clerical Workers 4,316 6,847 
Sales Workers 3,103 7,569 
Craftsmen, Foremen 4,345 7,197 
Operatives 3,416 6,112 
/7 Michael P. Fogarty, 11The Small Chil d Gap and Other Problems,11 Personnel 
Management, 4:2, (February, 1972}, p. 21. 
/8 John E. Buckley, 11Pay Differences Between Men and Women in the Same Job," 
Monthly Labor Review, 94:11, (November, 1971}, p. 36. 
/9 Phyllis Jones Springen, 11The Dimensions of the Oppression of Women--Unequal 
Pay for Equal Work,11 Vital Speeches, 37:9, (February 15, 1971), p. 266. 
/.l.Q.. United States Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports: 1966. 







In the military, wage discrimination is still encountered in the payment of Basic 
Allowance for quarters to married servicewomen only if her husband is actually 
dependent on her, while the married serviceman collects it regardless of his 
wife's income. The servicewoman is also shortchanged in the benefits for which 
her husband is qualified if he is a civilian (e.g., medical, exchange privileges). 
Rather surprisingly in this age of youth orientation, the woman worker over 
40 often has an edge over her younger counterparts where jobs are concerned . 
" ... Women who have lived through the Depression have a very different idea about 
work, are more dedicated and interested, and may devote more attention to their 
jobs and especially to details .. .. "/11 Job training is often denied young women 
because " ... the tradition has been toassume that training will be wasted because 
the trained woman is likely to leave for life by the time her first child is born. 11 
/12 While this may be a form of discrimination, for many years there was acer-
tain degree of pragmatism associated with it. However, when married women reenter 
the labor force as their children grow older, they tend to be behind their former 
male contemporaries and are less likely to be considered for promotion since their 
experience is not so current. 
At the root of much sexual discrimination is man's and woman's perception of 
the role the woman is to play. Senator Barry Goldwater allegedly made the point 
quite clear when he reportedly said "God put both sexes on earth and each has its 
own purpose. I'd hate like hell to wake up next to a pipe-fitter." Current per-
ceptfons of both men and women concerning the working woman appear to be under-
going a slow but definite change. Although various forms of job di scrimination 
still exist, the value of the working woman to the economy is becoming more widely 
recognized. More women are being allowed to enter some of the traditionally male 
occupations. In the military services the opportunity for women to serve in other 
than administrative and managerial positions is being increased. In the civil 
service more women are being assigned to policy making and upper management posi-
tions. 
On the other hand, women still represent less than ten per cent of the fol-
lowing professions: doctors, lawyers, engineers, dentists, chemi~ts, physicists 
and clergy./13 In most cases, female representation in these fields has changed 
by less than~o per cent in the last forty years. Americans traditionally tend 
to thtnk of tfiese occupations as basically male professions and women are often 
cons i·de·red to be soci a 1 mts fits i_ f they enter them. 
Women's self-perceptions of themselves tend to make them feel self-conscious 
about being women and professionals at the same time. "They may overreact to 
conceal or inhibit 'womanly attributes,' and over-confonn or overproduce in an 
attempt to make up for their situationally downgraded status. 11/J.i A difficult 
problem for woman managers is that of directing and giving orders to men. Young 
men in particular are frequently very resentful of taking orders from women. 
They are at a point in their lives where they are trying to improve their self-
image of manliness, and taking orders from women is alien to the desired image. 
"Perhaps, just as he is in the process of establishing a strong managerial self-
concept, being managed by a person that the culture tells him is not endowed with 
/11 Walter Wingo, "Here Come the Girls," Nation's Business, 57:12, (Decem-
ber, 1969), p. 39. 
/JI Fogarty, Op. Cit . , p. 19. 
/13 Cynthia F. Epstein, 11Encountering the Male Establishment : Sex Status 
Limitson Women's Careers in the Professions," American Journal of Sociology, 
75:6, (May, 1970), p. 967. 
/1.i Epstein, Op. Cit., p. 978. 
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managerial characteristics gives him no acceptable model to which to relate. 
Regardless of the reason, young men are strongly against working for women ... /15 
Through the years, much legislation has been generated in thi s country concerning 
the working women. Many of these laws resulted from the blatant abuse of workers 
by hard driving industrialists in periods when strong unions did not exist. Var-
ious laws regulating the type and duration of work which could be performed by 
women gradually became so numerous that many women began to feel discriminated 
against rather than protected. 11The sixty-year traditio n of protective laws for • 
women is bei'ng challenged by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.0 /16 It 
ts interesti'ng to note that tile i"dea of equal rights for women was included in 
the bill by accident and not through serious effort to improve the lot of women. 
An amendment o the civil rights bill was added by a Virginia member of the House 
of Representatives under the assumption that it would assure defeat of the bil l . 
There were no women's groups petitioning for or supporting the sex amendment. 
Since the Equal Pay Act of 1963, several federal measures have been taken to 
reduce sex discrimination in employment. In addit i on to the Ci.vil Rights Act of r 
1964 are 11 ••• Executive Order 11246 as amended by Executive Order 11375 of October 
13, 1967, which bans discrimination on the basis of ... sex . . . by federal contractors, 
and ... tfte Age Di'scrimination in Employment Act of 1967, which protects most indi-
vtduals over 40 until they reach the 65th birthday, regardl ess of sex. "/IT These 
measures are significant and are causing employers to pay heed, as the courts have 
set strong penalties in several cases which have come before them. 
Many state labor laws have been cancelled or changed as a result of the fed-
e.ral measures. Some of these changes have been beneficial and others have removed 
statutes which many women considered necessary. 11The year 1970 saw more decisive 
developments than heretofore in resolving the apparent confl ict between federal 
and state law. Invalidation, repeal, or major modification of state law is the 
trend. "/18 
While discrimi nation against working women will not disappear in the next 
t en years, it will probably be reduced significantly. Tol erance is spreadi ng, 
and many women are proving their competence in new fields . They have made great 
gai'ns in new industries without preconceived perceptions of job structure, such 
as the computer field. Women occupy a large portion of the more challenging jobs 
in tne computer area, and have shown themsel ves to be at least as competent as 
tfiei.r male cmmterparts . Tfley are 6et ng taken slowly but inexorably into higher 
management positions and the rate will probably increase in the future as accep-
tance grows. In the military, women are being placed in command positions over 
men for the first time, and considerat i on is being given to assigning woman naval 
officers on combatant ships in non-combat billets such as personnel and supply 
jobs . Enlisted women are being provided the opportunity to apply for training in 
the same specialties as their male counterparts. U 
/15 Marshall H. Brenner, 11Management Development for Women,11 Personnel 
JournaT:°51:3, {March, 1972), p. 168. 
/16 Raymond Munts and Davi d C. Rice, 11Women Workers; Protection or Equality?11 
l'ndustrfal and Laoor Relations Review,. 24:1, (October, 1970), p. 5. • 
/17 Ro6ert D. Moran, 11Reducing Discrimination: Role of the Equal Pay Act,' 1 
MontnlyLaoor Review, 93:6, (June 1970), p. 30. 
/18 Sylvia Weissbrodt, "Changes in State Labor Laws in 1970,11 Monthly Labor 






11It is estimated that progress toward equality of opportunity for women is 
three to five years behind that of racial equality. 11/19 If current indications 
hold true, women will be moving into new professions in increasing numbers through 
necessity if not from desire. Three occupations which have provided numerous jobs 
to women are not expected to have sufficient capacity to absorb the potential wo-
men job seekers in the next ten years. These are the fields of teaching, nursing 
and library science. Other professions largely occupied by women, such as medical 
laboratory work, home economics, and social work are expected to expand, but not 
enough to absorb all the new job seekers. 
Areas of great future potential for women include medicine, dentistry, and 
engineering. Rapid growth of architectural, draftsman, veterinarian, legal, and 
scientific and engineering technical jobs is also expected./20 The supply of 
physicians is expected to grow at a much slower rate than the demand, providing 
great opportunity for women who can get the training. The same is true for den-
tistry. Despite the existing situation in the fields of engineering and science, 
projections for the 19701 s indicate a shortfall of graduates to fill the demands 
of the future. While only a small percentage of women were craftsmen in 1968 
(3 per cent),/21 growth of manpower needs in this area is expected to attract an 
increasing number of women. The combination of increased opportunity in various 
occupations and increased tolerance and acceptance of women 11doing their own thing 11 
should result in a radically changed composition of the labor market over the next 
ten years. More companies are attempting to place women in diversified areas to 
comply with new labor statutes. 
These advances will not be without problems. There is much conjecture con-
cerning the future of the family as it is currently structured. More companies 
are daily providing nursery care for working mothers as a fringe benefit. Will 
this 1 ead to a breakup of the family? 11The continuing trend toward pol i ti cal 
liberalism in the West has made it difficult for the logical person to glorify 
egalitarian ideals and yet keep women in the subordinate role expected of her 
in a patriarchial society. Margaret Mead goes so far as to predict that by the 
year 2000 the family unit will be completely abandoned; parenthood would be left 
to a few state-supported couples . "/~ More women than ever before are entering 
college, and they are now approaching their education with a career rather than 
a marriage in view. "A degree is now thought of by more women as a steppingstone 
to roles in business and the professions, rather than as something to be acquired 
to fi 11 the gap before marriage. 11 /23 
What might result from young men being placed under the command of women? 
Will there gradually be a loss of masculinity? Will women remain feminine? Will 
our social structure be able to handle it? Can we cope with the radical changes 
which will be acting on our intellects and perceptions? These and other questions 
are being asked and are at the root of resolving the problem of sexual discrimina-
tion. The answers will be revealed by the future. 
/12. Mary J. Kay, "A Positive Approach to Women in Management,i1 Personnel 
Journal, 51:1 (January 1972), p. 39. 
/20 Hedges, Op. Cit., pp. 24-28. 
ID_ Ibid. 
/22 Marilyn C. Hahn, "Equal Rights for Women in Career Development,11 
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